The Effect of R&D on Merge Acquisition – The Role of Corporate Liability

本文的主旨為驗證企業的合併案中，企業的研發支出以及公司債務情況對於成為被併購目標的影響，以及兩者之間的交互作用效果，在過去的文獻中，對於此兩者之間的交互作用討論有限。本文的假說為有二，其一為高研發支出的公司在未來更容易成為被併購的目標，其二為若該公司同時存在高債務的情形下，該效果則會抵消。而實證結果顯示，當以流動負債作為財務槓桿的衡量方式，且併購案最終有完成交易的情況下，兩者之間的交互作用項將會達顯著負向的關係，亦即當企業有著較高的短期債務，隨著研發支出的增加，將會顯著降低該企業成為被併購方的可能性。然而，若僅考慮併購案最終撤銷的案例時，此兩者之間的交互作用便不復存在。其合理的解釋為，在被併方的財務情況較為吃緊的情況下，仍持續進行研發將會增加欲併購的企業對於流動性的疑慮。在這樣的情況下，併購方不願意承擔該企業的流動性負債。This paper examines the effect research and development (R&D) expenditures on the likelihood of being a takeover target firm in the merge and acquisition (M&A) by focusing on the corporate leverage. Namely, this article proposes potential intersection effect between the R&D expenditure and leverage on the takeover probability. There are two hypotheses in the study, one is “High R&D firms have higher merger probability to be M&A targets”, the other is “But high R&D firms with high lability are not M&A targets”. The empirical evidence shows a negative intersection effect between R&D expenditure and leverage when M&A deals are completed. Moreover, the negative effect is found when current debt is measured as the leverage variable. The effect of leverage on the relation between R&D and takeover probability is gone when I focus on the M&A withdrawal cases. The explanation might be when the merge target firm has high level of current debt, the more R&D expense may bring more concern to the merger because of liquidity concern. Accordingly, the firm may unwilling to bear the current debt of the takeover target under this situation