The Road toward the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)- An Analysis of Two Level Games and Asymmetric Negotiation Theory

歐盟與加拿大在2014年9月完成雙邊自由貿易協定談判（The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, CETA）。對歐盟來說，《歐加自由貿易協定》是歐盟第一個與七大工業國所簽訂的自由貿易協定；對加拿大來說，這是該國有史以來最具野心的貿易協定，因此本協定對於雙方的重要性不言可喻。雖然目前已有許多學者對《歐加自由貿易協定》進行分析，但現有的研究成果多集中於歐加簽署協定之動機、目的，以及對產業可能造成的衝擊，而缺乏對於談判過程、談判策略之研究，因此本文希望彌補這樣的缺口，以談判理論，來分析《歐加自由貿易協定》。 本文將分為兩大部分：首先，透過「雙層賽局理論」分析在談判中，歐盟與加拿大政府所面臨的國內外限制，以及雙方政府採取什麼樣的策略，突破這些挑戰；第二部分，將以「不對稱談判理論」分析《歐加自由貿易協定》談判中，權力要素如何影響談判，及加拿大是否能透過談判策略的應用，克服權力差距，爭取最大的談判利益。 本文發現，歐盟與加拿大政府之談判策略，符合雙層賽局理論之分析，雙方分別透過自縛、暗盤交易、議題連結、反射等策略，回應談判中的國內外限制；且《歐加自由貿易協定》之談判結果，亦符合不對稱談判理論中的立論，綜合國力並非決定談判結果之關鍵要素，雙方對於「議題權力」之掌握與否，才是決定談判輸贏的最重要原因。EU and Canada completed CETA negotiation in September 2014. There is abundant research studying this ambitious FTA, but most of them put their emphasis on the incentive of signing CETA, or the potential economic impact for both entities, literally none of current studies focus on the negotiation process. This paper hopes to fill up the gap by using negotiation theory to analyze CETA. This paper is divided into two parts. First, it uses Putnam’s “two-level game theory” as the main research framework in order to see the governments’ strategies in the negotiation. This paper verifies the model and finds out that the governments used cutting slack, side payment, issue linkage, and reverberation to deal with domestic and international restricts in the negotiation. Second, the paper takes advantage of Habeeb’s “asymmetry negotiation theory” and find out that by holding “issue specific power,” Canada was able to overcome power weakness and win the negotiation in the particular issue