The Effect of Earnings Management on CEO Turnover

經理人可能出於自利動機而有從事盈餘管理之行為，而盈餘管理的方式可分成應計項目與實質盈餘管理二種，後者又有改變銷貨條件、減少裁決性支出及增加生產成本三種做法。本研究第一個部份即在探討當董事會以會計績效衡量經理人表現時，是否會關注會計盈餘組成份子中的應計數，尤其是裁決性應計數，假說一認為，董事會應可看穿應計項目盈餘管理，以真實盈餘衡量經理人績效，並對於經理人進行盈餘管理以提高盈餘之行為給予懲罰。實證結果發現董事會仍依據真實盈餘績效來更換經理人，而裁決性應計數雖對於經理人離職機率有決策上之攸關性，唯其增額之正向影響在統計上並不顯著。第二個部分是在探討實質盈餘管理對經理人離職機率的增額影響，假說二認為董事會很難發現經理人以改變經營決策來進行盈餘管理的行為，因此實質盈餘管理之異常現金流量與經理人離職關係應為負向相關。結果發現，利用銷貨條件之實質盈餘管理方式，會提高經理人的離職機率，但統計上仍不顯著；透過裁決性費用支出的減少則發現會顯著降低經理人的離職機率，顯示董事會可能無法看穿此伎倆給予懲罰；最後，研究發現生產成本的增加與經理人離職機率間並不具顯著關係。This study examines the effects of earnings components, especially the parts of earnings management, on the probabilities of CEO turnover. Prior studies classify earnings management into two broad categories: accruals-based and real earnings management. The results show that the incremental effect of discretionary accounting accruals on CEO turnover likelihood is positive but insignificant. Giving abnormally generous price discounts or lenient credit terms also increases the likelihood of CEO turnover but still statistically insignificant. However, reducing discretionary expenses can significantly decrease the probability of CEO turnover. This lower CEO turnover probability suggests that boards do not punish the earnings management through reducing discretionary expenses. Finally, the results show no significant relation between the CEO turnover and the real earnings management by overproduction