Auditor Industry Specialization and Pay-Performance Sensitivity of Executive Compensation

本文旨在探討採用產業專家查核之公司，其董事會是否會因為盈餘品質之提升而提高盈餘在主要經理人之薪酬權重。利用2005~2010期間之臺灣上市上櫃公司為樣本，研究結果顯示，產業專家與主要經理人之薪酬-盈餘敏感度有顯著正相關，而此結果不受產業專家衡量方式之影響，且在會計師事務所與會計師個人層級皆有相同發現。研究結果支持最適契約理論下，董事會在盈餘經產業專家查核而有較高品質時，提高主要經理人之薪酬-盈餘敏感度，俾使經理人與股東利益趨於一致。This study examines whether firms have higher pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation when audited by an industry specialist. Using a sample of publicly-traded Taiwanese companies during 2005-2010, this study finds that there is a significantly positive association between auditor industry specialization and pay-sensitivity of accounting performance. The results hold for both firm-level industry specialist and partner-level industry specialist. The findings are consistent with the optimal contracting theory that the board of directors increases the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation when the accounting-based measure is of higher quality due to higher auditor industry expertise