Strategic Asymmetry under Dual Sourcing -An Analysis of Capacity Investment Behavior

在今日的產業環境下，許多企業都逐漸朝向企業內部自我掌控度較高的垂直整合，或者全球化專業分工兩個方向發展。在專業分工的營運模式中，存在著將本身定位為專司產品設計與研發，或者專攻品牌管理而不具備大量製造所需產能的產品公司。為了滿足將其研發或設計的產品市場化的需求，產品公司大多委託專職代工的廠商提供商品製造的服務。由於產品公司能否滿足市場的需求，端視這些製造廠商能否提供高品質的服務決定，因此產品公司對製造商是否能夠滿足其所提出的各項需求將相當關切。 對於製造商而言，盈利來源為產品公司所下的訂單，然而設計與研發的能力並非其所擅長，具備製造能力的廠商也可能不止一家，因此一開始即與產品公司合作推出產品的市場先占製造商，面臨著潛在的對手進入市場爭奪訂單，除了透過擴充產能提升服務品質滿足產品公司的要求之外，還能在初期利用策略性承諾向競爭者傳達策略性訊息。其目的不外乎傳遞出強硬的競爭姿態，或者降低單一需求來源下的競爭強度。 為了獲得較佳的製造服務，產品公司將透過需求配給法則刺激製造商之間的競爭，此時引發出製造商之間不對稱的因應策略，將對產能投資行為構成有別於傳統Cournot與Bertrand模式下的結果。此一競爭結構下的三方互動與利害關係，都將受到需求配給法則與策略性投資的影響。In modern industrial environment, many companies are gradually shaping their supply chains to either vertical integration, which they can get higher degree of internal control, or specialization. In the later operating model, there exists a product firm specializing in product design and marketing who does not have enough capacity to fulfill market demand. In order to meet market demand and obtain better capacity supply, product firms usually outsource their orders to manufacturing companies and construct a demand rationing policy while inviting a new supplier into the supply chain. So the capability of those manufacturers determines how many orders they can take from the product firm. For manufacturers, orders from the product firm are their only source of profit, it is not likely for the incumbent to do nothing when facing a potential entrant to snatch its order. Beside improving service quality by expanding capacity to meet the product firm''s requirements, incumbent can also deliver a strategic commitment to the entrant. The structure of Three-way interaction under rationing policy creates a strategic asymmetry capacity investment behavior that is different from traditional Cournot and Bertrand competition