The Study on offshore island development fund

2000年《離島建設條例》通過以來，法定總額不得低於新臺幣三百億元的「離島建設基金」已完成十年編列。過去，「離島建設基金」成為離島縣市政府爭取各項建設的主要財源之一。從2000年起至2004年間，由內政部營建署負責統籌，此階段被定位為離島經濟發展的「成長期」，因此補助以各項基礎建設、公共工程為主，受到外界對於濫用財政資源、大興土木造成自然環境破壞的批判。2005年之後，改由經濟建設委員會主導，將離島發展改以「永續發展」作為政策目標，並委外成立「離島辦公室」，推動離島投、融資等多項政策變革，卻遭到地方政府質疑中央過度集權、集錢。 本文透過R. Musgrave的政府財政功能、特種基金理論與公共選擇學派提出的政府失靈四項問題等立論，針對「離島建設基金」成立、執行與管理進行全盤性的檢證。主要研究發現： 執行上，經由不同的執行率公式計算，歷年平均執行率僅有六成。其次，主要補助對象為離島三縣，以連江縣與金門縣執行較佳，年度平均執行率分別為76％與73％，而獲得最多補助款的澎湖縣，卻僅有54％其成效最差。在政府失靈的分析上，代議士對於「離島建設基金」的立法、預決算審議過程產生自利與矛盾。官僚制度所出現的問題則包含有：離島地方政府對於各項補助計畫執行力不佳、中央政府提出無效率之政策規劃。在分權化中，中央政府未能「依法行政」，離島地方政府也以「山不轉路轉，路不轉人轉」予以回應。另外，中央、縣級與鄉級行政組織也在資訊溝通上出現落差。最後，在直接民主的實踐經驗中，大部分的離島選民與非離島居民對於基金並不瞭解，但基於自利性的考量認為，離島區域屬於弱勢，中央政府自然應該給予合理的補助。 學理上，「離島建設基金」成立是為追求Musgrave所提出的財政資源「公平分配」（income distribution）功能，但是實質卻表現出為求選票及各方利益妥協下的預算政治。新制度學派認為政府提出具有目的性的政策，立法確保其財產權是為了避免「共同資源悲劇」（common-pool problem）的問題產生，使其政策得以延續。但是，「離島建設基金」並非財政獨立的會計個體，高度仰賴國庫挹注，不但無法落實特種基金之受益原則，亦無法實踐使用者付費的概念。我國預算相關法規雖然將「離島建設基金」分類於特別收入基金，會計理論將其定位為政事型基金，卻都有與法不符的現象，因而產生合理性爭議。 整體來說，離島地方政府對於基金預算執行能力不佳，中央政府也未盡其監管之責。對於「弱勢」離島進行財政補助之立意堪稱良善，但是使用錯誤的政策工具導致「離島建設基金」成為「政治象徵」，而未能發揮其作用。未來，中央政府應解決特種基金預算編列、執行考核等問題，並推動特種基金財政透明化工作。針對離島財政補助上，中央若能增設辦理離島業務人力與專責機關後，方可修法廢除「離島建設基金」之設置，回歸公務預算之正途。Offshore Islands Development Fund（離島建設基金）, passed in the year 2000, is an important financial resource for Taiwan’s island governments, like Penghu（澎湖縣）, Kinmen（金門縣）, LienChiang（連江縣）, and other small islets surrounding Taiwan. The central government allocates approximately a total of NT$30 billion exclusively for offshore islands for development projects such as transport infrastructure, fishing port, infrastructure construction through the Offshore Islands Development Act（離島建設條例）. During the first phase of the Act, between 2000 and 2004, the Ministry of Interior（內政部） weighted too much on durable and stable infrastructure development, and therefore had negative impact on the islands’ natural landscape. Also, funding was not used in a cost-effective fashion. Environmental organizations and media constantly criticized the Act. When the Council for Economic planning and Development（經濟建設委員會） overtook the leadership of the Act in 2005, it changed the island policy goal from “Growth stage” to “Sustainable Development Stage,” and promoted investment and financing planning and entrusted Institute for Physical Planning & Information (PPI) （財團法人國土規劃及不動產資訊中心）with island policy, and Offshore Islands Office was established. Still, island governments were not satisfied. This paper argues that the “Offshore Island Development Fund” has the proper motivation, but it is a wrong policy tool. According to laws and regulations of our budget, “Offshore Island Development Fund” is categorized in the Special Revenue Fund（Extra Budgetary Fund）, and the accounting theory regards it as “governmental fund.” Therefore, there has been a reasonable dispute about the fund. This paper uses several views and theories to validate “Offshore Island Development Fund” establishment, implementation, and administration. R. Musgrave’s theory about government fiscal functions: the allocation function, the distribution function, the stabilization function, and extra budgetary funds theory, and the Public Choices theory about four problems for government failures are adapted. Overall, there is poor execution capacity of the local government and insufficient supervision of the central government. The study identifies four main issues of the policy. The problems inherent in Bureaucratic Supply, for example, arise from the local governments’ poor implementation and the central government inefficiency of policy planning and decentralization. As a result, average implementation rates of LienChiang County, Kinmen County and Penghu County are 76%, 73%, and 54% respectively. Penghu performs the worst, but ironically gets the most share of the funding. “Offshore Island Development Fund” is established to pursuit the function of “income distribution” raised by Musgrave. However, it turned out to be budget politics under compromise for the sake of votes and the interests of all parties. About the Representative Government problems, legislators tend to legislate and consider the budget and final accounts on the basis of self-interest and contradiction. The lack of communication among the central government, local county and township administrative organizations also appears. Furthermore, the residents of both inlying and outlying islands misunderstand the funds. People usually take it for granted for the central government to give the vulnerable islands regions allowance. In terms of New Institutionalism, the Government proposes a purposeful policy. And for the continuity of its policy, legislation has to ensure the property against “common-pool problem.” However, the “Offshore Island Development Fund” is not financially independent accounting entity. And being highly dependent of the state treasury can practice neither “compensation principle” from the special fund nor the concept of user fees. In the future, the central government should address the special fund budget, assess the implementation, and promote financial transparency of special funds. Financial assistance and the central business of additional manpower and organizations for the Islands should be enforced before amending the law by repealing the setting of “Offshore Island Development Fund” and returning it to the regular public budget