A Study of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of China and its African Allies: From Small State Theory and Social Exchange Theory

本文以社會交換理論與小國理論解釋1998-2009年中華民國外交節節失利，尤其是在非洲國家，並最終採用「外交休兵」之因。過去學者對中華民國外交狀況的關注，多集中於整體外交情勢分析，即便對特定區域(包括非洲)有所著墨，卻有不夠深入之憾。本文因此從社會交換理論與小國理論切入探討1998-2009年中華民國對非洲外交行為。我們首先界定中華民國及其於1998年後之非洲邦交國皆屬小國，並提出以下假設： (一)、中華民國以其經濟優勢來鞏固非洲友邦國的外交承認。 (二)、非洲友邦願意把外交承認交換金錢外援。 (三)、因上述的外交關係存在，故台非外交關係可被視爲交換關係。 (四)、南非與中華民國斷交之後，中華民國在非洲的友邦皆屬於小國，故台非關係成爲小國交換關係。 (五)、由於形成台非的小國交換關係，故易于被第三方干涉，尤其是具有龐大國際政經影響力的中共介入，更易使中華民國失去友邦。 從第二章起，本文依序爬梳李登輝末期、陳水扁時代、及馬英九執政之初的外交政策及非洲邦交國數字的起伏，發現中華民國自從務實外交政策開始，就以經濟優勢來換取非洲邦國的外交承認，這即屬於一種交換關係。既然台非外交互動屬於交換關係，行動者必然深受市場特徵影響，一旦出現第三者誘之以利，就會破壞這個關係的平衡。在本文中，這個第三者就是1979年開始崛起的中共。其挾著優勢政經實力介入台非的交換關係，是造成中華民國對非外交節節敗退的主因。 而馬政府上台後採取的外交休兵策略，如果以社會交換關係來看，就是將破壞台非交換關係的中共因素釜底抽薪，因此最終達成保持非洲邦交國的目的。故對本文而言，雖然馬英九的外交休兵政策約束了中華民國的主權，使其外交前景受制於中共，但卻消除了兩岸外交鬥爭最棘手的因素。如此一來，中華民國才能專心恢復正常外交活動、經貿發展以及參與國際組織的目標，進而為兩岸及非洲大陸共同邁向安定及互相利益發展做出貢獻。The theoretical framework of this thesis is a composite of two theories: the social exchange theory and small state theory. Both are employed to analyze the steady decline of the Republic of China’s diplomatic standing in Africa from 1998-2009. The diplomatic downturn in this period largely contributed to the R.O.C.’s decision to eventually adopt the policy of a ‘diplomatic truce’ with the People’s Republic of China. In the past, scholars have often adopted a more generalized approach to evaluating the foreign relations of the R.O.C., overlooking the various nuances of country or region-specific analyses. This paper focuses on Taiwanese-African relations after the loss of South Africa, its last large ally on the continent, up until Ma Ying-jeou’s first year in office. If we assume that subsequent to 1998, the R.O.C. and all of its African allies can be categorized as ‘small states,’ then the author can delineate the following assumptions: 1.The R.O.C. relied upon its economic advantage to secure the diplomatic recognition of its African allies. 2.The R.O.C.’s African allies were willing to exchange diplomatic recognition for economic aid. 3.The two aforementioned assumptions establish that this relationship is based upon the principle of social exchange. 4.After South Africa severed formal diplomatic relations, the R.O.C., and the latter’s remaining African allies were all ‘small states.’ Therefore, this shift initiated a social exchange diplomatic relationship between solely small states. 5.The nature of this exchange relationship allows it to be easily manipulated by a third party. A rising economic and political powerhouse like the P.R.C. could influence this vulnerable relationship to cause the R.O.C. to lose diplomatic footing. Chapter two through four analyzes the foreign policies and fluctuations in the number of diplomatic allies in each of the R.O.C.’s presidential administrations. These chapters seek to expound on the R.O.C.’s policy of pragmatic diplomacy, which is narrowly defined as exchanging economic assistance for diplomatic recognition. Chapter two focuses on Lee Teng-hui’s diplomatic policy in Africa subsequent to the loss of South Africa, the third chapter proceeds to examine Chen Shui-bian’s policy during his two terms as R.O.C. president, and finally the fourth chapter dissects the African policies of the current president, Ma Ying-jeou. Even though the relationship between the R.O.C. and its African allies can be viewed as an exchange relationship, the parties involved inevitability will be influenced by outside market forces. Once a third party emerges with a better offer, the original relationship is predictability destabilized. This thesis asserts that the P.R.C. has acted as a third party in the R.O.C.’s diplomatic affairs, especially after 1979, when it increasingly emerged as an influential global player. Thus, this paper presumes that the P.R.C.’s continual use of its political and economic advantage to intervene in Taiwanese-African diplomatic relations is the primary cause of the R.O.C.’s declining stance in the region. After President Ma Ying-jeou assumed office, he announced that a ‘diplomatic truce’ with the P.R.C would be a key tenet of his foreign policy. If we assess this policy shift from the perspective of social exchange theory, it will have an ameliorating effect on the P.R.C.’s detrimental influence on Taiwanese-African relations. Thereby, the R.O.C. will finally be able to stabilize its number of African allies. This paper also asserts that although the diplomatic truce policy restricts the R.O.C.’s sovereignty, conversely it eliminates the central cause of contention in the Cross-Strait diplomatic battle for international recognition. Subsequently, the R.O.C. will be able to realize its diplomatic objectives of resuming normal diplomatic activities, fostering greater economic and trade development, and participating in international organizations. Henceforth, this policy can contribute to an increasingly stable and mutually beneficial Cross-Strait relationship