Economic Growth, Labor Hours and Social Welfare in a Small-Open Economy:under the Regime of Inflation Rate Targeting

本文透過透過涵蓋以貨幣形式發放之工資的交易付現限制機制引入貨幣於小型開放經濟體系，藉此架構內生成長模型，並透過此模型探討在政府實施釘住通貨膨脹率水準的貨幣政策框架下，動態體系的均衡性質。此外，本文亦探究，政府是否可藉由改變釘住的通貨膨脹水準來主導本國經濟成長率，並進一步分析通貨膨脹率水準改變對勞動工時的影響。再者，本文亦嘗試透過數理推導及量化分析討論最適通貨膨脹率與以貨幣型式發放工資的比例二者間的關係。最後，本文探究，當央行採取何種法則的貨幣政策，具有和採取以釘住通貨膨脹率對等的效力。 本文結論可歸納為：(1)動態體系均衡呈現特定解 (2)改變通貨膨脹率水準無法影響經濟成長率 (3)通貨膨脹率水準與勞動工時兩者間存在亦模糊關係 (4)以貨幣型式發放工資的比例提高，社會最適通貨膨脹率會隨之增加 (5)當央行選擇以釘住匯率或國內債券名目利率為貨幣政策指標時，其具有和釘住通貨膨脹率對等的效力。This paper introduces money, via the cash-in-advance mechanism, into an endogenous growth model for a small-open economy, and then uses this model to investigate properties of the dynamic equilibrium. Besides, the paper examines the effect of changing the anchor of the inflation rate on labor hours and balance growth rate. Moreover, quantitative analysis of the model is applied to explore the connection between the optimal inflation rate and the ratio of monetary wage. Lastly, we discuss the fundamentally equivalent monetary policy anchor to the inflation rate targeting. The conclusion of this article can be summarized as follows: (1) the dynamic equilibrium is locally determinate; (2) a rise in the inflation rate cannot boost the balance growth; (3) the increase in the inflation rate has an ambiguous effect on the steady state level of labor hours; (4) the larger rise in the ratio of monetary wage expands the optimal inflation rate by a larger amount; and (5) the exchange rate targeting and domestic interest rate targeting are both fundamentally equivalent to the inflation rate targeting