A Study on the Transaction Costs of Farmland Expropriation on Chinese Mainland

中國大陸自改革開放以來，城鎮化及工業化的發展極為迅速，對土地需求量很大，而政府以徵收方式取得農村土地甚為頻繁，農民常因感覺權利受損，時而引發抗爭事件。因此，本文以台灣土地徵收制度為基礎，比較中國大陸實施的土地徵收制度，從而發現在目前中國大陸的土地徵收制度中，有13項的規定與土地徵收要件偏離。故先以R.H. Coase (1937)主張的交易成本(Transaction Cost)理論，將該13項比較項目歸為致使交易成本擴大的原因，也是造成農民抗爭行為的導火線。另再進一步應用義大利經濟學家Vilfredo Pareto(1848-1923)的效率理論，判斷由於這13項偏離原因，導致中國大陸的土地徵收制度沒有達到資源最適配置之要求。緣此，若考量交易成本，則政府對農村土地的徵收數量應該減少，才可達成資源之最適配置。易言之，倘若中國大陸改善這些交易成本擴大的因素，將使農民抗爭的誘因降低，使整個社會的福利增加。Since the economic reform in 1979, the Chinese government has been expropriating farmland to meet the increasing demand for land in their rapid urbanization and industrialization. Farmers whose lands were expropriated without proper compensation fought for their rights and numerous incidents occurred. This thesis thus studies the farmland expropriation on Chinese Mainland from the perspective of transaction costs with a comparison with the land expropriation system in Taiwan. 13 violations of law’s requirements for farmland expropriation are found in China in this study. All these 13 violations, according to R. H. Coase’s transaction cost theory (1937), have something to do with the increased transaction costs in farmland expropriation in China and are the cause of farmers’ fights with the authority. Based on the efficiency definition by Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), this study further shows that the optimal amount of farmland expropriation in China is not reached because of these violations. Thus in order to achieve optimal amount of farmland expropriation, reduce the transaction cost thus occurred, lower farmers’ incentive to fight with the authority and thus the number of incident, and increase social welfare, the amount of farmland expropriation has to be decreased