BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY FOR A DIVIDED SOCIETY: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LEGISLATIVE PROCESS UNDER MAJORITARIAN PREDICAMENT

解嚴以來，臺灣在過去廿餘年間經歷了民主化進程中七次修憲與兩次政黨輪替，一般認為已經達成「民主鞏固」的標準；但所謂的民主化帶來的政治權力競逐也使得政壇與社會存在著政治不信任與非理性對立，導致政治的作為與不作為往往既無全民共識也無品質可言。在全球競爭與環境變遷的嚴苛挑戰下，治理能力的喪失甚至有可能發生「民主退潮」的風險，建構正當且有效的決策機制是因應這個風險的不二法門。 論文第二章從首先從民主理論出發，認為臺灣政治與社會的不信任與非理性對立源自於威權統治與反威權統治之間關於「國家認同」、「族群關係」、「轉型正義」與「權力分配」問題的對抗脈絡延續至今且相互連動，形成學理上的「分裂社會」，使得以「多數決」為主軸的憲政體制因為欠缺「競爭」而失靈，形成「多數決困境」。有鑑於此，論文分析各家學說後提出以「協合民主」與「審議民主」結合的觀點，延伸出「擴大參與」、「充分審議」與「權力分享」三項原則，做為回應臺灣分裂社會的指導方針。 本文於第三章確認了在我國憲政體制下，立法院(國會)的組織與功能應為落實三項原則的最佳機關。並分析「民主原則」與「正當程序」兩個我國憲法價值足以承載、涵蓋「擴大參與」、「充分審議」與「權力分享」，為具體的制度設計奠定符合規範要求的基礎。第四章則承續第三章的論點，專門針對欠缺競爭的「國家認同」、「族群關係」、「轉型正義」與「權力分配」議題，從立法院「提案」、「審議」、「表決」三大環節分析現制之不足並提出「共識審議程序」做為制度的建議。 第五章則先再次從規範面探討「共識審議程序」與現行可能相抗的機制(覆議、違憲審查、公民投票)的互動，以及本身的合憲性問題。接著從「制度認同」的觀點，評估共識審議程序的制度成效，以及在臺灣脈絡的經驗中，可以供民主理論參考精進之處，並於第六章做成結論。With a series of constitutional amendments and the two-turnover test, the democratization of Taiwan in the past twenty years has been generally considered succeceful. However, the democratization is a mixed blessing which brings not only democratic achievement, but also political distrust and irrational confrontation among the politicians and civil society. These maladies ofen lead to decisions made upon neither concesus nor rational basis, which would undermines the quality of governance and result in a setback of democracy. Therefore, to better the decision-making process becomes an essential to modify the perturbation of setback of democracy. This thesis analizes democratic theories and the social context of Taiwan in Charpter 2. First, I argue that the political distrust and comfrontation mainly originate from the antagonism between the authoritarian regime and the anti-authoritarian movement, which focuses on the issues and relevant policies of national identy, ethnical relationships, transitional justice and the distribution of political power. As a result, Taiwan meets the standard of “divided society”as a system of segamental cleavages which lacks of political competition in majority rule and makes minority permanently under domination－circumstance I call“majoritarian predicament”. To overcome this predicament, I suggest the combination theory of consociational democracy and deliberative democracy, then extracting three guiding principles: utmost participation, through and through deliberation, and power-sharing. In Charpter 3, I identify the Legislative Yuan (congress) as the most competence branch to realize the three principles under the Constitution and the social context; meanwhile, democracy and due process as constitutional values could be the basis for the constitutionality of institution design according to the three principles. Then in Charpter 4, I examine the current legislative process with these principles and then advise a“consociational-deliberative process”to reconstruct the legislative process targeting on motion-proposing, deliberation and voting then realizing utmost participation, throung and through deliberation and power-sharing. Finally, I conclude my thesis in three dimensions in Charpter 5. From the normative aspect, I reexamine the constitutionality of the process and clearify its relation with veto, judicial review and referendum; second, the institutional aspect, with foreign experiences and Taiwan context, I evaluate the consociational-deliberative process from the aspect of “institutional identity”to assess if this process can reach consensus and make rational decision, which may create identity to each policy and this decision-making mechanism; last but not least, I raise some theoretical suggestions base on the study of Taiwan. I make my conclusion in Charpter 6