Defensive Repurchases: The Managerial Entrenchment ersus Shareholder Interests

本篇論文利用股票購回公司的被接管機率與其長期績效，來檢測管理者在使用防禦性股票購回時的動機。實證結果發現，被接管機率與長期績效是呈現顯著的負向關係。這個結果支持管理者鞏固職位假說，即公司在被接管機率很高的情況下進行股票購回，則相對於其它股票購回的公司，它會有比較低的長期績效表現。更進一步的來看，擁有很大私利的管理者其鞏固職位的現象是比較明顯的。另一方面；上述的結論在我們控制了其它的影響因素之後，它仍然是被支持的。本篇論文提供了解釋股票購回公司的管理者動機，另外，也提供了一條新的管道來解釋股票購回公司的長期績效表現。This paper examines the relation between the ex ante takeover probability and firm’s stock abnormal return and operating performance in explaining the managerial incentives for the defensive open-market share repurchase. We find a significantly negative relation between a firm’s takeover probability and its stock abnormal return and operating performance response to announcements of open-market repurchase. This evidence supports the managerial entrenchment hypothesis that repurchasing firms generate a lower performance for firms with high takeover probability. The results are more pronounced for the CEOs of repurchasing firms with larger private control benefits or with more protected by antitakeover provisions. Furthermore, these findings hold even after controlling for other potentially influential variables. Our paper provides a better understanding of the managerial incentives for announcing open-market repurchase, as well as provides a new way to explain post-repurchase long-run stock abnormal return and operating performance.口試委員會審定書 i謝 ii文摘要 iii文摘要 iv. Introduction 1I. Hypotheses Development and Related Studies 4A. The management incentives to use open-market repurchase as defensive mechanism in response to takeover attempts 4B. Private control benefits and managerial incentives 6C. Antitakeover provisions and managerial incentives 7D. Actual share repurchases and managerial incentives 8II. Samples Selection 9A. Estimated The ex ante Takeover Probability 9B. Open-Market Share Repurchases 9V. Empirical Methodologies 10A. Takeover Probability Estimation 10B. Stock Performance 11C. Operating Performance 12D. Private Control Benefits 13E. Entrenchment Index 15. Empirical Results 16A. Variable Construction and Sample distribution 16B. The ex ante Takeover Probability Estimation 17C. The Determinants of Actual Share Repurchases 18D. Takeover Probability and Stock Performance 19E. Takeover Probability and Operating Performance 24F. Controlling for Earnings Management and Market Competition 26G. Sensitivity Test 28I. Conclusions 28EFERENCES 30ppendix 3