The Corporate Governance Mechanism and Long-term Investment Activities

本研究乃是企圖找出上市公司之公司治理因子和其轉投資行為的關係。一般公司藉由轉投資行為來分散其營運風險，但是轉投資行為往往會形成母公司在資金、技術或者是商譽等無形資產的移轉，間接形成一種對母公司小股東的利益剝削行為，透過利益的分配圖利了轉投資公司的部份股東。實證結果發現母公司的公司治理機制會影響其轉投資行為。當母公司董事會結構具有較佳的獨立性、專業性以及監督機制時，對於轉投資公司的持股比率普遍較高；此外，母公司的股權結構呈現金字塔結構時，對於轉投資公司的持股比率則是有負向的影響。儘管第二大股東的監控程度在本研究中並不顯著，但是依舊可以驗證母公司的股權結構以及董事會組成對於其轉投資行為仍有相當程度的影響力。The major purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and firm’s long-term investment activities of all the listed companies in Taiwan. Although some companies diversify their operating risk through these kinds of investment activities, some long-term investment activities may benefit the controlling shareholder of the parent company at the expense of minority shareholders through the transfer of funds and technology to the invested subsidiaries. The empirical results indicate that corporate governance mechanism does influence the strategies of the parent company’s long-term investment activities. The better the independency, professionalism and monitoring function of the board of directors, the higher the shareholding of the subsidiaries. Furthermore, the existence of a pyramid structure of the parent company’s ownership structure results in a negative influence on the shareholding of the subsidiaries. Although the second largest shareholder is not associated with the long-term investment activities in our results, we still come to the conclusion that board composition and ownership structure do have impacts on the pattern of long-term investment activities of the parent companies.I. Introduction 1 II. Hypotheses Development 7 II.1. Hypothesis 1:Convergence of Interest Hypothesis 9 II.2. Hypothesis 2:Information Transparency Hypothesis 11 II.3. Hypothesis 3:Professionalism Hypothesis 13 II.4. Hypothesis 4:Substitution Hypothesis 16 II.5. Hypothesis 5:Efficient Monitoring Hypothesis 18 III. Data and Methodology 21 III.1. The sample and period 21 III.2. Methodology 23 III.3. Descriptive statistics 25 IV. Empirical Results 28 IV.1. Preliminary analysis 28 IV.2. Multivariate regression results of subsidiaries according to producible activities 35 IV.3. Multivariate regression results of subsidiaries based on the parent company’s shareholding 39 V. Conclusion and Comments 44 VI. Reference 4