Toward a Holistic Theory of Predication

在本論文中，我提出對表述問題的一條新進路。我將表述問題重新界定為以下的兩個問題：（一）是何依據使得我們能單義地使用同一個述詞來表述不同事物？（二）是什麼能整合一個句子的各部份（通常為一名稱與一述詞），成為一個單一的表述，而非僅僅為字詞的表列？我們可以稱第一個問題所關心的為「分類的單一性」，第二個為「命題的單一性」；一個表述理論，便是對這兩個問題所提出的系統性回答。 前三章我將批評三種對表述問題的傳統進路：實在論、惟名論、以及概念論。實在論者解釋表述的方式，是去設置某些抽象的元目做為述詞的語義值，並試圖證明表述只不過是在個體與抽象元目之間的一種關係。我將特別討論殊質理論，尤其是培根(1995)新近的陳述與討論。在第二章，我把惟名論的進路描繪如下：他們試圖透過將我們所使用的語言，翻譯或重述為惟名論可接受的語言，作為表述的語言基礎。我將討論卡納普(1928)從感覺與料建構性質集的計劃，與費爾德(1980)惟名論化科學理論的計劃，將之應用在處理表述問題上的可能性。至於概念論的進路，我將追溯此傳統至康德對概念的超驗分析，與布倫坦諾的意向性，但我的重點會放在麥農的對象理論，和假裝理論，兩個理論上。我將論證，以上的三種進路都注定要失敗。 我把傳統進路失敗的原因分析為分裂的問題：它們皆試圖透過劃分來為表述放下基礎，並努力將表述的本質化約至此基礎上。因此它們無法認知到，在一個表述理論當中，有三個因素是不可或缺的：世界與世界中事物之排列、語言的邏輯結構、以及心靈做判斷的能力。根據這樣的分析，我提出了一條新的進路──整體論式的進路，即，一個將這三個重要因素結合在一起的統一理論。我注意到蒯因和戴維森的整體論計劃，恰好足夠成為這樣一條進路的背景，因此我在第四章中將發展並應用他們的計劃來解釋表述。我的結論是：整體論式的進路，是惟一能夠對表述問題給出另人滿意的解釋之進路。In this thesis I present what I believe to be a new approach to the problem of predication. I shall reformulate the problem of predication as the following two questions: (1) What justifies our univocal use of one and the same predicate expression to predicate of several different things? (2) What unifies the parts of a sentence, usually a name with a predicate, to make a single predication rather than a mere list of words? Let us call what the first question concerns “the unity of classification,” and the second “the unity of the proposition”; a theory of predication, then, is a systematic account to answer such two questions. In the first three chapters, I provide a critical review of three traditional approaches to predication in turn: the realist, the nominalist, and the conceptualist approach. The realist approaches predication by positing abstract entities as the semantic values of predicates, attempting to show that predication is nothing but a relationship between an individual and an abstract entity. Special attention will be paid to the Trope theory, especially J. Bacon’s (1995) new formulation and discussion. In Chapter Two, I characterize the nominalist approach as one that explains predication by some way of translation or reformulation of the language in use into a “nominalistically acceptable language” as the linguistic foundation for predication. I discuss the possibility of applying Carnap’s (1928) project of constructing quality classes from sense-data, and H. Field’s (1980) nominalist program of nominalizing the scientific theory, to an account of predication. As for the conceptualist approach, I trace this tradition back to Kant’s transcendental analysis of concepts and Brentano’s intentionality thesis, but my focus will be on the Meinongian theory of object and the pretense theory. I shall argue that the three aforementioned approaches are all doomed to fail. I analyze the failure of the traditional approaches as the cleavage problem: all of them attempt to lay some foundation for predication by making cleavages, and endeavor to reduce the nature of predication to such a foundation. They therefore fail to recognize that in a theory of predication, three factors are indispensable: the world with the arrangement of things in it, the logical structure of our language, and the mental faculty of the making judgments. Based on such an analysis, I propose a new approach to predication—the holistic approach, one which intends to combine the three important factors to yield a unified theory of predication. I notice that Quine and Davidson’s holistic programs happen to provide such a background sufficient for a full-scale theory of predication, which I shall work out in Chapter Four. I conclude that the holistic approach I advocate is the only possible approach that satisfactorily explains predication.Introduction 1 1. The Realist Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.1 The Universal theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.2 The Trope theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2. The Nominalist Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.1 A general outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 2.2 The Carnapian version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 2.3 The Fieldian version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 2.4 The collapse of the nominalist approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 3. The Conceptualist Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 3.1 The Kantian version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 3.2 Brentano’s intentionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 3.3 The Meinongian version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 3.4 The fictionalist version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 4. A Holistic Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 4.1 The holistic program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 4.2 Quine’s holistic view . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 4.3 Davidson’s holistic view . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 4.4 Toward a holistic theory of predication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Conclusion 153 Bibliography 15