Reexamination on Optimal Strategic Trade Policies: Policy Interactions of Import Tariffs and Export Subsidies

本文採用Brander-Spencer (1985)兩 出口國與一進口國的基本模型，來探討當進 口國採行不同的關稅制度時，兩出口國的出口補貼政策。本文發現當進口國採行 單一關稅制度，兩出口國會採用出口補貼，而當進口國採行歧視性關稅制度，在 某些情況下，兩出口國會課徵出口稅。此外，本文發現進口國的最適關稅制度為 單一關稅制度，但在某些情況下，兩出口國卻偏好歧視性關稅制度。 本文亦探討當此三國政府皆不知道兩出口廠商的成本時，在進口國採行不同的關 稅制度下，兩出口國出口補貼政策的Nash 均衡。在線性市場需求及高低兩種成 本類型的假設下，本文發現當進口國採行單一關稅制度，兩出口國均提供單一出 口補貼，而當進口國採行歧視性關稅制度，兩出口國均課徵單一出口稅。本文亦 發現進口國的最適關稅制度為單一關稅制度，但只要兩出口廠商的預期成本差距 夠小，兩出口國均偏好歧視性關稅制度。This project examines the non-cooperative interactions between two exporting countries and one importing country when all of them are seeking the optimal policies to improve their welfare. While the importing country has the incentive to impose tariffs on the goods coming from the two exporting countries, the export policies chosen by the exporting countries depend on the tariff regime, whether uniform or discriminatory tariffs are used. With complete information, it is argued that export taxes are chosen by both exporting countries in some cases, and that while the importing country prefers a uniform tariff regime, the exporting countries find a discriminatory tariff regime preferable. We also extend the Brander-Spencer (1985) framework to examine the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of export subsidy policy under incomplete information when the firms’ costs are unknown to the exporting and importing countries. With the assumptions of linear demand and two types of a firm’s cost, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is that both exporting countries use a single pooling export subsidy (tax) under a uniform (discriminatory) tariff regime. Moreover, we find that the importing country would optimally choose a uniform tariff regime. However, both exporting countries prefer a discriminatory tariff regime as long as the expected cost differential between the two firms is small enough