The Formation of Exporting Manufacturers' Associations: A Transaction Cost Analysis

本研究的主旨，是在探討會員廠商由同業公會處取得必要的服務，使「同業公會」 成為「市場」(廠商向外採購服務)與「層級」(廠商自行提供服務)交易之外的第三種選 擇，這其中交易成本理論扮演何種角色。本文選取台灣區電機電子同業公會為實證對 象，以宏碁電腦為該公會中最具代表性之廠商，進行訪談。本研究之觀測樣本即為廠商 的重要價值鍊活動或服務，共有56 筆，解釋變數共有11 個，包括資產專屬性、不確定 性、交易頻率、信譽效果、協調成本和交易相關性等。本文將出口相關服務的來源分為 「廠商—外部市場—公會」提供三種，再用Ordered Probit 模型分析會員廠商對此三種 交易組織方式的偏好，是否與這11 個交易特性變數有關。本文發現交易成本理論的確 可以解釋部份公會存在的原因，對於同業公會之管理者而言，為達到公會會員之利益最 大化，公會所選擇提供之服務，應為廠商在交易成本最小化原則下，由同業公會來提供 可以達到最低交易成本者。This paper is devoted to the economics of trade associations (TAs). It tries to understand how "trade associations" may become a third alternative to "market" or "hierarchy" from a transaction cost perspective. We argue that a TA is an efficient governance mechanism which alleviates member firms some of the transaction costs. The TC-saving capacity of TAs is mainly due to their hierarchical control of the activities especially related to common interest representation, asset specificity, reputation effect, and coordination and adaptation problems. For example, TAs may arise when member firms need a collective body with goodwill reputation to represent their interest but also want to reduce coordination costs. TAs are also governance structures which quasi-integrate some important export-related services (e.g., information gathering). TAs may also resolve conflicts among members, mimicking a third-party control mechanism. The propositions raised in this paper are tested using survey data. We find that the TC-saving capacity of TAs has a lot of managerial and policy implications that deserve further empirical investigation