The Optimal Control Mechanisms for Rivalry among the Channels with Uncertain Demand

在不確定需求下，通路間為了爭奪顧 客與利益而發生激烈內部競爭，進而為與 其交易的製造商帶來交易成本，本研究探 討在市場需求不確定下，通路競爭的情 形，以及這種內部競爭在通路系統中的影 響與衍生的交易成本。進而，分析各種通 路控制機制之績效，以及製造商如何建立 適當的通路控制機制，以消弭外部通路成 員的品牌內競爭，減少製造商與行銷通路 間的交易成本。研究結果發現，製造商面 臨不確定的市場需求及二個以上互相競爭 的獨立通路，且銷售至通路的貨品數量超 過最適銷售量時，而由於未完全內化的通 路(中間商)將會發生降低價格以期增加銷 量或要求降低批發價等行為。因此，若無 法抑制獨立通路間的競爭，製造商的經濟 效率就會降低，也就是在不確定需求下， 中間商互相競爭將使製造商增加交易成 本。在模型解中，垂直整合及限制轉售價 格可減少製造商損失，在實證中，獨家經銷或獎酬也有同樣的效益。This research considers a manufacturer facing uncertain demand. Despite its best forecasting efforts, a manufacturer may produce and sell to its independent retailers more output than they can subsequently resell at the joint profit-maximizing price. Having paid for the output, these rival retailers do not fully internalize the manufacturer’s market power and may sell more than the joint profit-maximizing quantity. If retailers anticipate this possibility ex ante, they reduce the wholesale price they will pay the manufacturer to reflect the dissipation of these quasi rents. Without some mechanism to prevent rivalry, the manufacturer ultimately bears the costs. The stylized model assumes two periods, two retail locations, linear demand, and two possible outcomes: high demand and low demand. Anticipating this, they will not pay as much for the merchandise ex ante as they would if the manufacturer could commit to preventing rivalry. The quantity model and empirical study found that vertical integration, minimum resale price, reward, and exclusive dealer can reduce the loss result from intra-competition