The Effects of Client Noncompliance on Cooperation and Foreign Policy Decision-Making in International Patron-Client Relationships

The foreign policy decisions of small, weak states often go overlooked in the international system. Most understandings of small states emphasize their limited foreign policy choices under the influence of larger, global powers. Yet, there are numerous examples of small states selecting their own foreign policies unencumbered by the international system. This study seeks out those examples and argues that weak states often have the freedom to form their own policies and positions uninfluenced by global powers. To explain the foreign policy decision-making process of small, weak states and explore the relationship between small and large powers, this paper asks when and how do small, weak client states choose to not comply with the demands of large patron states in patron-client relationships? The use of the patron-client framework is a valuable tool for analyzing the foreign policy selection process of small and large states interacting in dyadic relationships. To answer the question, the study examines three separate cases involving patron-client relationships. In each case, the United States serves as the patron state while El Salvador, Pakistan, and Thailand represent the separate client states. The case studies examine moments of client-driven noncompliance to reveal how small states form foreign policy decisions. Ultimately, small states not only wield significant control of their own foreign policy decisions, choosing not to comply with the demands of a stronger patron state, but they also form policy based off diverse considerations—including domestic factors, self-interest, and capacity to comply. Findings suggest that clients in international patron-client relationship have more influence over stronger states than current theories would suggest