Forgiveness and Responsibility

In Forgiveness and Responsibility, I investigate the nature and norms of moral forgiveness. The standard account of forgiveness claims that forgiving is (or at least requires) the overcoming of resentment. I argue, however, that there is no single way to forgive and so no non-trivial set of necessary and sufficient conditions for forgiveness. I identify the prototypical manifestation of forgiveness, using it to explain the diversity of our forgiveness practices. Prototypical manifestations of forgiveness are cases of directed forgiveness, in which one takes up a certain kind of forgiving attitude towards a wrongdoer and overtly manifests that attitude, most notably by a speech act. This speech act crucially involves the victim relinquishing certain of her rights to blame the wrongdoer, as well as releasing the wrongdoer from certain kinds of personal obligations to the victim. Other modes of forgiveness are understood as extensions of the prototype to the extent that they share either the interior, psychological features or the exterior, behavioral features of directed forgiveness. I conclude by arguing that in order to preserve certain intuitive views about the norms bearing on forgiveness, our best theories of forgiveness should hold that: (1) forgiving is prototypically under one's voluntary control; (2) wrongdoers cannot obligate their victims to forgive them; and (3) forgiving alters the norms of interaction between victim and wrongdoer.Release 01-Jun-201