Diplomatic recognition as coercive diplomacy: The inter-American experience

This work examines U.S. recognition policy toward governments obtaining power through extra-legal means (coup d'etat or revolution). The purpose of the research is to evaluate the effectiveness of withholding diplomatic recognition as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Through empirical analysis of U.S. recognition policy toward Latin American states (1913-1994), the research determines if the withholding of diplomatic recognition enabled the United States to influence the behavior and policies of target governments, under what conditions the strategy is successful, and what conditions influence the U.S. to withhold recognition. Withholding recognition is treated as a bargaining strategy intended to elicit a desired response from the target state in exchange for diplomatic recognition by the United States. An analytical framework derived from the coercive diplomacy model, developed by Alexander George, is used to evaluate policy effectiveness. The intent is not only to determine if the U.S. recognition strategy succeeded or failed but also to identify conditions conducive to successful use of the policy in order to guide contemporary foreign policy choices