An investor who uses a limit order in order to trade, instead of a market order, saves the bid-ask spread but incurs an execution delay. Thus, the use of limit orders slows down the rate at which gains from trade are realized, and then has a negative effect on welfare. With comparative statics, I show how some liquidity measures co-vary with investors’ welfare. I find that market depth negatively co-varies with welfare while the limit order execution rate positively co-varies with welfare. Indeed, when market depth is due to orders inefficiently queuing in the book, the limit order execution rate is low. It suggests that limit order execution rate should be taken into consideration for assessing market quality
Limit order markets with stationary dynamics attract equal volumes of market orders and uncanceled l...
We examine the effect of selected limit order tools (stop loss, take profit, and trailing stop) on t...
Centre for Economic Policy Research, Londres, n° 8395/2011We study competition between a dealer (OTC...
An investor who uses a limit order in order to trade, instead of a market order, saves the bid-ask s...
We investigate the role of limit orders in the liquidity provision in a pure order-driven market. Re...
International audienceCompetition among trading platforms has considerably reduced trading fees in s...
International audienceWe develop a dynamic model of a limit order market populated by strategic liqu...
We analyze the role of liquidity provision of limit order traders in the NYSE. Using an extensive li...
We show how the supply of liquidity in order driven markets is affected if limit orders (LOs) are fo...
This paper examines the relationship between limit order submissions and liquidity. We find that the...
I investigate the relationship between liquidity and market efficiency using data from short-horizon...
The paper analyzes the rationale for and profitably of limit order trading. Although limit orders ar...
Individual investors lose money around earnings announcements, experience poor posttrade returns, ex...
Limit order traders can mitigate non-execution risk by canceling limit orders with low probability o...
[[abstract]]This study investigates how limit orders affect liquidity in a purely order-driven futur...
Limit order markets with stationary dynamics attract equal volumes of market orders and uncanceled l...
We examine the effect of selected limit order tools (stop loss, take profit, and trailing stop) on t...
Centre for Economic Policy Research, Londres, n° 8395/2011We study competition between a dealer (OTC...
An investor who uses a limit order in order to trade, instead of a market order, saves the bid-ask s...
We investigate the role of limit orders in the liquidity provision in a pure order-driven market. Re...
International audienceCompetition among trading platforms has considerably reduced trading fees in s...
International audienceWe develop a dynamic model of a limit order market populated by strategic liqu...
We analyze the role of liquidity provision of limit order traders in the NYSE. Using an extensive li...
We show how the supply of liquidity in order driven markets is affected if limit orders (LOs) are fo...
This paper examines the relationship between limit order submissions and liquidity. We find that the...
I investigate the relationship between liquidity and market efficiency using data from short-horizon...
The paper analyzes the rationale for and profitably of limit order trading. Although limit orders ar...
Individual investors lose money around earnings announcements, experience poor posttrade returns, ex...
Limit order traders can mitigate non-execution risk by canceling limit orders with low probability o...
[[abstract]]This study investigates how limit orders affect liquidity in a purely order-driven futur...
Limit order markets with stationary dynamics attract equal volumes of market orders and uncanceled l...
We examine the effect of selected limit order tools (stop loss, take profit, and trailing stop) on t...
Centre for Economic Policy Research, Londres, n° 8395/2011We study competition between a dealer (OTC...