To better understand the intriguing mechanisms behind cooperation among decision-making individuals, we study the simple yet appealing use of preplay communication or cheap talk in evolutionary games, when players are able to choose strategies based on whether an opponent sends the same message as they do. So when playing games, in addition to pure cooperation and defection, players have two new strategies in this setting: homophilic (respectively, heterophilic) cooperation which is to cooperate (respectively, defect) only with those who send the same message as they do. We reveal the intrinsic qualities of individuals playing the two strategies and show that under the replicator dynamics, homophilic cooperators engage in a battle of messag...
Does the possibility to talk to people we interact with change the outcomes of our interactions? Com...
While in previous models of pre-play communication players are forced to communicate, we investigate...
Abbreviations frequently used: T – Payoff for defecting on a cooperator R – Payoff for mutual cooper...
To better understand the intriguing mechanisms behind cooperation among decision-making individuals,...
To be the fittest is central to proliferation in evolutionary games. Individuals thus adopt the stra...
ÄBSTRACT This paper deals with stochastic reactive strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilem...
We consider a spatial model of the emergence of cooperation with synchronous births and deaths. Agen...
We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dile...
Many investigations have been carried out in order to get an idea of what the driving forces behind ...
In this paper we propose a pluralistic and multi-dimensional approach to cooperation. Specifically, ...
In human societies the probability of strategy adoption from a given person may be affected by the p...
Nature shows as human beings live and grow inside social structures. This assumption allows us to ex...
Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Ite...
It is challenging to reach a balance between desired cooperation among agents as the team tasks requ...
The emergence and maintenance of cooperation is a popular topic in studies of information sciences a...
Does the possibility to talk to people we interact with change the outcomes of our interactions? Com...
While in previous models of pre-play communication players are forced to communicate, we investigate...
Abbreviations frequently used: T – Payoff for defecting on a cooperator R – Payoff for mutual cooper...
To better understand the intriguing mechanisms behind cooperation among decision-making individuals,...
To be the fittest is central to proliferation in evolutionary games. Individuals thus adopt the stra...
ÄBSTRACT This paper deals with stochastic reactive strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilem...
We consider a spatial model of the emergence of cooperation with synchronous births and deaths. Agen...
We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dile...
Many investigations have been carried out in order to get an idea of what the driving forces behind ...
In this paper we propose a pluralistic and multi-dimensional approach to cooperation. Specifically, ...
In human societies the probability of strategy adoption from a given person may be affected by the p...
Nature shows as human beings live and grow inside social structures. This assumption allows us to ex...
Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Ite...
It is challenging to reach a balance between desired cooperation among agents as the team tasks requ...
The emergence and maintenance of cooperation is a popular topic in studies of information sciences a...
Does the possibility to talk to people we interact with change the outcomes of our interactions? Com...
While in previous models of pre-play communication players are forced to communicate, we investigate...
Abbreviations frequently used: T – Payoff for defecting on a cooperator R – Payoff for mutual cooper...