19 pagesRapport interneIn this paper we propose a general definition of secrecy for cryptographic protocols in the Dolev-Yao model. We give a sufficient condition ensuring secrecy for protocols where rules have encryption depth at most two, that is satisfied by almost all practical protocols. The only allowed primitives in the class of protocols we consider are pairing and encryption with atomic keys. Moreover, we describe an algorithm of practical interest which transforms a cryptographic protocol into a secure one from the point of view of secrecy, without changing its original goal with respect to secrecy of nonces and keys, provided the protocol satisfies some conditions. These conditions are not very restrictive and are satisfied for m...
We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of cryptographic protocols. In contrast to...
We introduce a new class of security protocols with an unbounded number of sessions and unlimited fr...
AbstractWe present the first cryptographically sound security proof of the well-known Otway-Rees pro...
The main result of this paper is that the Dolev-Yao model is a safe abstraction of the computational...
. We develop principles and rules for achieving secrecy properties in security protocols. Our approa...
Abstract. We present the first cryptographically sound security proof of the well-known Otway-Rees p...
Abstract Inductive proofs of secrecy invariants for cryptographic protocols can be facilitated by se...
In this paper, we extend previous results relating the Dolev-Yao model and the computational model. ...
Abstract. We prove the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol secure under real, active cryptogr...
We develop a systematic proof procedure for establishing secrecy results for cryptographic protocols...
In this work, we present an algebraic approach for modeling the two-party cascade protocol of Dolev-...
Polynomial time adversaries based on a computational view of cryptography have additional capabiliti...
Abstract. Polynomial time adversaries based on a computational view of cryptography have additional ...
The standard symbolic, deducibility-based notions of secrecy are in general insufficient from a cry...
This thesis is developed in the framework of the symbolic analysis of security protocols. The contri...
We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of cryptographic protocols. In contrast to...
We introduce a new class of security protocols with an unbounded number of sessions and unlimited fr...
AbstractWe present the first cryptographically sound security proof of the well-known Otway-Rees pro...
The main result of this paper is that the Dolev-Yao model is a safe abstraction of the computational...
. We develop principles and rules for achieving secrecy properties in security protocols. Our approa...
Abstract. We present the first cryptographically sound security proof of the well-known Otway-Rees p...
Abstract Inductive proofs of secrecy invariants for cryptographic protocols can be facilitated by se...
In this paper, we extend previous results relating the Dolev-Yao model and the computational model. ...
Abstract. We prove the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol secure under real, active cryptogr...
We develop a systematic proof procedure for establishing secrecy results for cryptographic protocols...
In this work, we present an algebraic approach for modeling the two-party cascade protocol of Dolev-...
Polynomial time adversaries based on a computational view of cryptography have additional capabiliti...
Abstract. Polynomial time adversaries based on a computational view of cryptography have additional ...
The standard symbolic, deducibility-based notions of secrecy are in general insufficient from a cry...
This thesis is developed in the framework of the symbolic analysis of security protocols. The contri...
We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of cryptographic protocols. In contrast to...
We introduce a new class of security protocols with an unbounded number of sessions and unlimited fr...
AbstractWe present the first cryptographically sound security proof of the well-known Otway-Rees pro...