Insiders´ views as a predictor of stock performance : can insider trading be used to predict stock performance on the United States stock market?

This thesis studies the possibility of using information on insiders’ transactions to forecast future stock returns after the implementation of Sarbanes Oxley Act in July 2003. Insider transactions between July 2003 and August 2009 are analysed with regression tests to identify the relationships between insiders’ transactions and future stock returns. This analysis is complemented with rudimentary bootstrapping procedures to verify the robustness of the findings. The underlying assumption of the thesis is that insiders constantly receive pieces of information that indicate future performance of the company. They may not be allowed to trade on large and tangible pieces of information but they can trade on accumulation of smaller, intangible pieces of information. Based on the analysis in the thesis insiders’ profits were found not to differ from the returns from broad stock index. However, their individual transactions were found to be linked to future stock returns. The initial model was found to be unstable but some of the predictive power could be sacrificed to achieve greater stability. Even after sacrificing some predictive power the relationship was significant enough to allow external investors to achieve abnormal profits after transaction costs and taxes. The thesis does not go into great detail about timing of transactions. Delay in publishing insiders’ transactions is not taken into account in the calculations and the closed windows are not studied in detail. The potential effects of these phenomena are looked into and they do not cause great changes in the findings. Additionally the remuneration policy of an insider or a company is not taken into account even though it most likely affects the trading patterns of insiders. Even with the limitations the findings offer promising opportunities for investors to improve their investment processes by incorporating additional information from insiders’ transaction into their decisions. The findings also raise questions on how insider trading should be regulated. Insiders achieve greater returns than other investors based on superior information. On the other hand, more efficient information transfer could warrant more lenient regulation. The fact that insiders’ returns are dominated by the large investment stake they maintain all the time in their own companies also speaks for more leniency. As Sarbanes Oxley Act considerably modified the insider trading landscape, this analysis provides information that has not been available before. The thesis also constitutes a thorough analysis of insider trading phenomenon which has previously been somewhat separated into several studies.siirretty Doriast