Two experiments on cooperation and reputation in networks

The purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis by Raub and Weesie (1990) that embeddedness in social networks fosters cooperation in repeated dyadic Prisoner’s Dilemmas via reputation effects. Data were collected in two computerized laboratory experiments. In the experiments, subjects played 40 rounds of a game in which they played dyadic Prisoner’s Dilemmas with the other members of their group. The experimental manipulation involved whether subjects could observe the actions of all other group members or not. This dataset is provided for replication purposes for the following publication: Corten, R. Buskens, V., Rosenkranz, S. and Cook, K.S. (2016). “Reputation effects in social networks do not promote cooperation: an experimental test of the Raub & Weesie model”. Forthcoming in PLOS ONE. Further details of the experimental design are provided there. An example of the instructions used is provided in the file repexp - Instructions - emb_V3.pdf