Libertarian theory of free will

U ovom radu zastupam tezu prema kojoj slobodu volje valja razumjeti kao kontrolu nad alternativnim mogućnostima odluĉivanja, kontrolu koja se moţe osigurati samo u indeterministiĉkom svijetu. Metodološki okvir unutar kojeg branim vlastitu tezu moţe se okarakterizirati kao empirijski osviještena konceptualna analiza. Nastojao sam obraniti održivost takvog tradicionalnog metodološkog pristupa dokazujući neosnovanost kritika upućenih od strane negativnog programa eksperimentalne filozofije. Pri tome sam odbacio i pristup onih koji jedan dio rasprave o slobodi volje nastoje prikazati kao metafiziĉki irelevantan. Tvrdim da je kompatibilistiĉki pristup raspravi o slobodi volje neprihvatljiv. Smatram da argumente pomoću kojih kompatibilisti brane mogućnost drugaĉijeg postupanja u deterministiĉkom svijetu valja odbaciti te uz pomoć argumenta posljedice nastojim pokazati neodrživost ideje drugaĉijeg postupanja u tom istom svijetu. Mišljenja sam da se uz pomoć više argumenata može pokazati da determinizam nije kompatibilan ni sa slobodom formuliranom u terminima djelatnikovog autorstva radnji. Frankfurtovu kritiku principa alternativnih mogućnosti nastojim odbaciti na temelju argumenta dileme, ĉime pokazujem opravdanost prakse atribucije moralne odgovornosti koja se temelji na našoj mogućnosti drugaĉijeg odluĉivanja. Sagledavajući opravdanost formuliranja libertarijanistiĉke teorije slobode volje odbacujem argumente kojima se indeterminizam nastoji prikazati kao prepreka slobodnom odluĉivanju. Pri tome nastojim pokazati konstruktivnu ulogu koju indeterminizam ima prilikom formuliranja teze slobode volje shvaćene kao kontrole nad alternativnim mogućnostima odluĉivanja. Kod postizanja tog cilja libertarijanistiĉke teorije događajnog uzrokovanja kao i ne-uzroĉne teorije pokazale su se kao neprimjerene. Stoga smatram i branim tvrdnju da slobodu volje shvaćenu kao kontrolu nad alternativnim mogućnostima odluĉivanja moţemo plauzibilno formulirati jedino unutar libertarijanistiĉke teorije događajnog uzrokovanja.The main thesis of this dissertation is that free will, if understood as a thesis about control over alternative possibilities, can be plausibly formulated only in an indeterministic world. An empirically sensitive conceptual analysis has been adopted as the methodological framework within which such a thesis is formulated. Such an analysis can be criticized from two separate philosophical standpoints: the negative program of experimental philosophy and the work of naturalistically inclined philosophers who believe that several questions formulated within the free will debate are metaphysically irrelevant. I have tried to show that these criticisms are ill formulated and cannot prove what they purport to prove. In order to prove the main thesis of this dissertation, I hold that several aspects of the compatibilist approach are unacceptable. Namely, by relying on the consequence argument, I argue that it is implausible to suppose that one can act otherwise in a deterministic world. I also find unacceptable the idea that freedom, conceived as control over the production of actions, is compatible with determinism. Using the prior-sign dilemma defense I respond to Frankfurt‟s criticism of the principle of alternative possibilities and, by doing so, I defend the idea that our practice of holding someone morally responsible can be safely grounded in the possibility of deciding to act otherwise. In order to justify the application of a libertarian approach to the conception of freedom as control over alternative possibilities, several problems inherent to that approach have to be addressed. I argue that indeterminism should not be considered as a threat to free will, rather it should be regarded as constitutive of our ability to decide to act otherwise. I reject the approach to libertarianism that relies on special forms of agent causation and approaches that remain silent on the issue of causation of decisions. Therefore I defend the idea that the only available libertarian approach which can guarantee control over alternative possibilities is one that is formulated within the theory of event causation