La percezione mediante l'immaginazione

In the present work, I bring the lectures of Wittgenstein and Gadamer into contact with the manuscripts of Merleau-Ponty with the intention of going over the construction of the “concept of representation” and of reflecting on the following questions: what place does the aesthetic dimension occupy in human experience? In aesthetic experience, is just as necessary to recognize the emotional profile as the cognitive profile? The point of the departure is that aesthetics must not be understood as a simple perception by the senses. That which no discourse of aesthetics may conceal is its necessary implication of the problematic horizon of perception, following the actual etymology of the term, derived from the Greek aisthēsis. This term contains just as much the subjective and unstable field of sensation as it does the stable field of perceptual discriminations that tend to be structured. The theoretical affirmation is that the experience of the encounter with a work of art unveils a world. No sooner do we stop seeing the work of art as an object and start seeing as a world, then we realize that art reveals itself to be the expedient that clarifies the meaning of our perceptual relationship with the world, this perceptual syntony between the essence of the world and the sensing of subjects, this expressive processuality in which activity and passivity are horizons that can certainly be distinguished in description, but that cooperate internally