Epistemic Game of Thrones

The aim of this paper is rather modest: I want to provide an account of some of the most recent developments in epistemology, characterized by a certain shift that has been going on for some time now. This shift is best explained as the abandonment of traditional, monistic picture (according to which knowledge is the only important achievement in our attempt to cognitively grasp the world), and the acceptance of pluralism (according to which there are other important cognitive achievements we should strive for, most notably understanding and wisdom). One of the crucial aspects of this shift is the question about which cognitive state inherits knowledge as the prime epistemic value and this is the aspect I will be mostly interested in. I will claim that the pluralistic picture fits much better into our cognitive engagement with the world, with other people and with ourselves. In that sense, rather than rooting for one value as the holder of the epistemic throne, we should acknowledge the irreplaceable contribution that each has for our attempts to come to terms with who we are and with our experience of the world