Combinatorial auctions are formulated as frustrated lattice gases on sparse random graphs, allowing the determination of the optimal revenue by methods of statistical physics. Transitions between computationally easy and hard regimes are found and interpreted in terms of the geometric structure of the space of solutions. We introduce an iterative algorithm to solve intermediate and large instances, and discuss competing states of optimal revenue and maximal number of satisfied bidders. The algorithm can be generalized to the hard phase and to more sophisticated auction protocols
Designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions (CAs) is a recognized open problem in mechanism ...
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions. It is u...
A fundamental problem in building open distributed systems is to design mechanisms that compute opti...
In this note, we present a statistical-physics framework for combinatorial auctions, i.e. multi-item...
This thesis concerns the interdisciplinary field of combinatorial auctions, combining the fields of ...
The thesis consists of four papers on combinatorial auctions and a summary. The first part is more o...
Combinatorial auctions are auction formats that allow agents to submit single bids for a set of dist...
Combinatorial exchanges are double sided marketplaces with multiple sellers and multiple buyers trad...
AbstractWe present a new framework for the design of computationally-efficient and incentive-compati...
AbstractAuctions are the most widely used strategic game-theoretic mechanisms in the Internet. Aucti...
Designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions (CAs) is a recognized open problem in mechanism ...
A combinatorial auction is an auction where multiple items are for sale simultaneously to a set of b...
Combinatorial auctions provide an important tool for mechanism design in multi-agent systems. When i...
A combinatorial auction is an auction where multiple items are for sale simultaneously to a set of b...
In combinatorial auctions that use VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders ...
Designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions (CAs) is a recognized open problem in mechanism ...
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions. It is u...
A fundamental problem in building open distributed systems is to design mechanisms that compute opti...
In this note, we present a statistical-physics framework for combinatorial auctions, i.e. multi-item...
This thesis concerns the interdisciplinary field of combinatorial auctions, combining the fields of ...
The thesis consists of four papers on combinatorial auctions and a summary. The first part is more o...
Combinatorial auctions are auction formats that allow agents to submit single bids for a set of dist...
Combinatorial exchanges are double sided marketplaces with multiple sellers and multiple buyers trad...
AbstractWe present a new framework for the design of computationally-efficient and incentive-compati...
AbstractAuctions are the most widely used strategic game-theoretic mechanisms in the Internet. Aucti...
Designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions (CAs) is a recognized open problem in mechanism ...
A combinatorial auction is an auction where multiple items are for sale simultaneously to a set of b...
Combinatorial auctions provide an important tool for mechanism design in multi-agent systems. When i...
A combinatorial auction is an auction where multiple items are for sale simultaneously to a set of b...
In combinatorial auctions that use VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders ...
Designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions (CAs) is a recognized open problem in mechanism ...
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions. It is u...
A fundamental problem in building open distributed systems is to design mechanisms that compute opti...