PREDICTION IN MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE NATURAL PHILOSOPHY (IN THE WORKS OF H. DALMATIN, F. GRISOGONO, J. DUBROVČANIN)

U ovom radu sam izložila problem predviđanja u srednjevjekovnoj i renesansnoj prirodnoj filozofiji, tako što sam dala historijsko-problemski pregled teme povezujući ju prije svega s epistemološkim problemom. Moja teza u ovom radu jest kako se kroz povijest može pratiti proces racionalizacije tumačenja svijeta što se očituje kako u određenju spoznaje, tako i u određenju predviđanja. Budući da je divinacija jedan od najznačajnijih oblika predviđanja za razdoblja kojima se bavim u ovom radu, taj isti proces racionalizacije prikazat ću i u razumijevanju divinacije. Rad je podijeljen u tri tematske cjeline. U prvoj sam se bavila općenito problemom predviđanja. Predviđanje sam prikazala u odnosu s pojmovima predznanja i znanja. Drugi je dio rada posvećen astrologiji kao najznačajnijem obliku divinacije. Astrologiju sam odredila kao divinacijsku vještinu koja tumači događaje na Zemlji na temelju kretanja i međusobnih odnosa nebeskih tijela kojima su pridodana određena značenja. U trećem dijelu rada bavim se problemom predviđanja na primjeru trojice hrvatskih filozofa: Hermana Dalamtina, Federika Grisogona i Jurja Dubrovčanina. Kod Hermana sam pokazala kako se astrologija ne promatra prvenstveno kao metoda predviđanja, već kako se on astrologijom koristi za tumačenje svoje ontološke slike svijeta. Grisogono je primjer renesansnog mislioca koji u potpunosti prihvaća astrologiju u svim njenim aspektima. Za njega je astrologija disciplina koja ima praktičnu primjenu u liječenju bolesti, ali i disciplina koja čovjeku pruža najuzvišenije znanje koje se stječe prirodnim putem. Kod Jurja Dubrovčanina, sam pak pokazala kako proces racionalizacije, uslijed kojega se astrologija u jednom povijesnom razdoblju nametnula kao najvažniji oblik predviđanja, dovodi do odbacivanja svih praznovjernih elemenata astrologije, odnosno do odbacivanja same astrologije u drugom razdoblju.The present work is focused on the problem of prediction in Medieval and Renaissance natural philosophy. The problem of prediction is exposed both in its historical context and in connection with other epistemological problems. My thesis is that in the course of history one can observe the process of rationalization in attempts to explain the world. This process of rationalization is noticeable both in the approach toward the evaluation of cognitive processes and in the role given to prediction. Since divination is one of the most significant forms of prediction in the historical periods I am focused on in this work, the very same process of rationalization will be noticable in the understanding of the role of divination.The work is divided into three parts. In the first part I addressed the general problem of prediction. The starting hypothesis was that prediction could and should be connected with knowledge and foreknowledge. Only in this mutual dependence of knowledge and foreknowledge on one side and prediction on the other one can grasp the full significance of prediction as such. Prediction, which is not a mere guessing, aims at knowledge, ie. foreknowledge. Foreknowledge is understood as knowledge of what temporarily follows after “now”. Knowledge is understood as defined by the Standard Analysis of Knowledge that defines knowledge as justified true belief. Justification presents the specific difference between knowledge and belief and therefore the question about justification is of utmost importance not only in philosophy but also in science in its historical development. The Standard Analysis of Knowledge can be applied on analyses of the periods on which I concentrate, ie. the Middle Ages and Renaissance. First it is necessary to keep in mind that justification in those periods is understood significantly differently than today’s science and philosophy understand the term. Justification in the Middle Ages and Renaissance does not take the systematical empirical data as a starting point of justifying a certain belief, but is based on ontological and theological suppositions which serve as a basis of undersanding empirical observations. Knowledge in those periods was understood in predominantly Aristotelian terms, as cognition of causes: this concept of knowledge links those periods directly with the relative Ancient notions. For a more complete understanding of the reception of the Ancient philosophy it is necessary to take into account the role of the Islamic tradition which not only mediated but also enriched the Ancient philosophy on its way towards the Christian West