In this thesis, the JavaDL logic is amended by a new modality for the verification of termination-insensitive, object-sensitive, flow-sensitive noninterference of memory locations in object-oriented programs, that is local variables and heap object fields. Noninterference is a security model applied in information flow analysis and the amended JavaDL logic improves the information flow analysis of Java Card programs using the JavaDL sequent calculus. JavaDL formulae are a superset of first-order logic formulae and the logic additionally contains dynamic logic modalities as well as a concept called updates for the transition and evaluation of Java Card program states. Noninterference of memory locations is a property of programs and the resp...
A common theoretical assumption in the study of information flow security in Java-like languages is ...
We present the first machine-checked correctness proof for information flow control (IFC) based on p...
Abstract. Non-interference is the property of a program not to leak any secret information. In this ...
Abstract. This paper contributes to the investigation of object-sensitive information flow propertie...
This paper specifies a nontermination-insensitive, interprocedural, information flow analysis for ob...
International audienceNon-interference guarantees the absence of illicit information flow throughout...
Programs with publicly accessible interfaces are increasingly used to process confidential data. Thi...
In the realm of sound object-oriented program analyses for information-flow control, very few approa...
A semantic-based approach is commonly considered more precise than the type-based approach to enforc...
submitted to TOPLAS in September 2007Non-interference is a semantical condition on programs that gua...
Today, nearly all personal computer systems are multiprocessor sys-tems, allowing multiple programs ...
International audienceIn this paper we present a flow-sensitive analysis for secure informa- tion fl...
Contains fulltext : 29857.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)Programs contain...
AbstractType systems and program logics are often thought to be at opposing ends of the spectrum of ...
In this paper we present a flow-sensitive analysis for secure information flow for Java bytecode. Ou...
A common theoretical assumption in the study of information flow security in Java-like languages is ...
We present the first machine-checked correctness proof for information flow control (IFC) based on p...
Abstract. Non-interference is the property of a program not to leak any secret information. In this ...
Abstract. This paper contributes to the investigation of object-sensitive information flow propertie...
This paper specifies a nontermination-insensitive, interprocedural, information flow analysis for ob...
International audienceNon-interference guarantees the absence of illicit information flow throughout...
Programs with publicly accessible interfaces are increasingly used to process confidential data. Thi...
In the realm of sound object-oriented program analyses for information-flow control, very few approa...
A semantic-based approach is commonly considered more precise than the type-based approach to enforc...
submitted to TOPLAS in September 2007Non-interference is a semantical condition on programs that gua...
Today, nearly all personal computer systems are multiprocessor sys-tems, allowing multiple programs ...
International audienceIn this paper we present a flow-sensitive analysis for secure informa- tion fl...
Contains fulltext : 29857.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)Programs contain...
AbstractType systems and program logics are often thought to be at opposing ends of the spectrum of ...
In this paper we present a flow-sensitive analysis for secure information flow for Java bytecode. Ou...
A common theoretical assumption in the study of information flow security in Java-like languages is ...
We present the first machine-checked correctness proof for information flow control (IFC) based on p...
Abstract. Non-interference is the property of a program not to leak any secret information. In this ...