Preventing tacit collusion is a key objective of regulatory and antitrust authorities. In order to determine what facilitates implicit coordination among competing firms, this thesis investigates principle characteristics of oligopolistic markets with respect to their propensity to collude tacitly. The main features are (i) strategic interactions of few competitors, (ii) multimarket contact between those firms, and (iii) vertically related upstream and downstream markets
This paper estimates the implicit model, especially the roles of size asymmetries and firm numbers, ...
We study collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma when firms' discount factor is priva...
Defence date: 3 October 2002Examining Board: Prof. Pierpaolo Battigalli, Università Bocconi; Prof. L...
Tacit collusion reduces welfare comparably to explicit collusion but remains mostly unaddressed by a...
In this thesis, we investigate three specific policy and regulatory issues from the field of law and...
In an infinitely repeated game where firms with (possibly asymmetric) capacity constraints can make ...
A “collusion puzzle” exists by which, even though increasing the number of firms reduces the ability...
In an infinitely repeated game where firms with (possibly asymmetric) capacity constraints can make ...
This paper analyzes the effect of cooperation in manufacturing on firms' inclination to collude in t...
Despite the fact that competition law prohibits explicit cartels but not tacit collusion, theories o...
This research project consists in a theoretical and experimental study of oligopolistic markets. I b...
Mouraviev I. Explicit Collusion under Antitrust Enforcement. Center for Mathematical Economics Worki...
Sellers in oligopolistic markets can cooperate in ways that diverge from the orthodox vision of comp...
The paper studies bidder behavior in simultaneous, continuous, ascending price auctions. The purpose...
This dissertation contributes to the theoretical literature on cartel formation, organizational stru...
This paper estimates the implicit model, especially the roles of size asymmetries and firm numbers, ...
We study collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma when firms' discount factor is priva...
Defence date: 3 October 2002Examining Board: Prof. Pierpaolo Battigalli, Università Bocconi; Prof. L...
Tacit collusion reduces welfare comparably to explicit collusion but remains mostly unaddressed by a...
In this thesis, we investigate three specific policy and regulatory issues from the field of law and...
In an infinitely repeated game where firms with (possibly asymmetric) capacity constraints can make ...
A “collusion puzzle” exists by which, even though increasing the number of firms reduces the ability...
In an infinitely repeated game where firms with (possibly asymmetric) capacity constraints can make ...
This paper analyzes the effect of cooperation in manufacturing on firms' inclination to collude in t...
Despite the fact that competition law prohibits explicit cartels but not tacit collusion, theories o...
This research project consists in a theoretical and experimental study of oligopolistic markets. I b...
Mouraviev I. Explicit Collusion under Antitrust Enforcement. Center for Mathematical Economics Worki...
Sellers in oligopolistic markets can cooperate in ways that diverge from the orthodox vision of comp...
The paper studies bidder behavior in simultaneous, continuous, ascending price auctions. The purpose...
This dissertation contributes to the theoretical literature on cartel formation, organizational stru...
This paper estimates the implicit model, especially the roles of size asymmetries and firm numbers, ...
We study collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma when firms' discount factor is priva...
Defence date: 3 October 2002Examining Board: Prof. Pierpaolo Battigalli, Università Bocconi; Prof. L...
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