Army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1710–1711

Straipsnis skirtas visiškai iki šiol istoriografijoje nenagrinėtam Lietuvos kariuomenės padidinimo 1710–1711 m. klausimui aptarti. Straipsnyje tiriamos Lietuvos kariuomenės didinimo ir organizavimo aplinkybės bei kokiu mastu pavyko tai įgyvendinti. Turimi istoriniai šaltiniai rodo, kad kariuomenė buvo didinama greičiausiai karaliaus dvaro iniciatyva, o Lietuvos bajorija, gresiant švedų ir turkų antpuoliui, šį planą, nors ir nenoromis, parėmė. Svarbus vaidmuo organizuojant ir išlaikant kariuomenę tenka Lietuvos didžiajam etmonui Liudvikui Pociejui. Labai nepalankiomis aplinkybėmis Lietuvos kariuomenę pavyko padidinti iki maždaug 16 tūkstančių karių. Straipsnio priede taip pat publikuojama 1710 m. Lietuvos kariuomenės sudėtis.This article looks at the issue of Lithuanian army augmentation in the post-Poltava period. There is virtually nothing written on Lithuanian army in 1709–1717 and this article aims at fulfilling this gap in the scholarship. The Council of Warsaw in 1710 summoned by King Augustus II to confirm his return to Poland increased the komput (military establishment) of Lithuania to 18,200 from 12,000 men on paper. It was intended that the national contingent would consist of 600 hussars, 3,000 petyhors, 2,000 light cavalry, and 600 Hungarian-style infantry, while the foreign contingent was established at 4,000 dragoons, and 8,000 German-style infantry. A separate fund to pay the foreign contingent’s officers was established which was a major innovation and meant that there would be a substantial increase in the number of privates in infantry and dragoon regiments. The national contingent, however, did not have its separate fund to pay the officers, and about 20 per cent of the establishment needs to be deducted for such payment. To make the augmentation in the depredated country easier, the Lithuanians accepted the king’s proposal to include 4,000 Saxons in the army roster. But because of Swedish threat to Saxony from Pomerania, the king decided to billet the Saxons in Poland, which would make the concentration of Saxon army easier if Saxony was attacked, and demanded Lithuanian grand hetman Ludwik Pociej recruit new native units in Lithuania. In the middle of 1710, the king asked the hetman to augment the army above 18,200 determined by the Council of Warsaw. The Lithuanians responded positively to the king’s plans to continue the war but there were severe shortage of funds which were made good by arbitrary contributions from noble and ecclesiastical manors. In the middle of 1710, the king asked the hetman to augment the army above 18,200 determined by the Council of Warsaw. The Lithuanians responded positively to the king’s plans to continue the war but there were severe shortage of funds which were made good by arbitrary contributions from noble and ecclesiastical manors. In the middle of 1710 the army was established at about 33,000 men on paper: 800 hussars, 3500 petyhors, 4900 light cavalry, 700 Hungarian-style infantrymen, 17 regiments of reitars and dragoons, 11 regiments of German-style infantry. Had all units been complete, the army would have reached about 23,000 men in total including officers: about 14,500 in the foreign contingent and about 8,500 in the national contingent. It was, however, impossible to reach such numbers. Sources indicate that in the middle of 1711 the Lithuanian army was about 16,000 menstrong. However, the foreign contingent’s regiments under direct command of hetman Pociej reached the strength envisaged in the komput, were well-equipped and armed. The success was substantial not least because of Pociej’s talent and that he did not begrudge his own funds for the army. The komput of 1710 is published as an attachment to the article