Problem of universals in the course of lectures on logics by Marcin Śmiglecki

Šiame straipsnyje analizuojama universalijų koncepcija, pateikta vieno žymiausių scholastinės filosofijos atstovų Lietuvoje Martyno Smigleckio logikos paskaitų kurse, dėstytame Vilniaus universitete 1586–1587 m. Kitaip sakant, nagrinėjami minėtose paskaitose pasiūlyti ontologinio, gnoseologinio bei loginio universalijų teorijos lygmenų tyrimo būdai. Prieinama prie išvados, kad šiuos lygmenis M. Smigleckis aptarė antrajai scholastikai būdingo eklektizmo dvasia.An eclecticism of second scholasticism is peculiar to the conception uf universals, involved in lectures on logics delivered in 1586 / 1587 in Vilnius University by professor Marcin Šmiglecki, one of the most prominent scholastic philosophers in Lithuania. Firstly, his way of investigation of the ontological level of the problem of universals cannot be strictly ascribed to the classical variants of realism and nominalism. The position of this scholiast, similar to that of Francis Suarez, would rather be regarded as an intermediate model between moderate realism and conceptionalism, as, like moderate realists, Šmiglecki maintained that universale are given in the very nature of individual things. But, contrary to above-mentioned realists, he refused to acknowledge the real existence of universals in particular entities. In his opinion, every nature bearing such a real existence is inevitably individual. Therefore universal nature exists in multitude of individuals just as much as it is cognised by human intellect, for this cognitive power alone is able to abstract the nature of particular things from individualizing conditions and thus render that nature a universal being. On the other hand, together with conceptualists Šmiglecki affirmed that universals have existence in our intellect. However, differently from conceptualists, this author has not attributed the status of universal to a common concept of similar particular things. In his opinion, universal is nothing but the very nature of real things, which our intellect abstracts from particularizing conditions and cognises beyond the frame of individuality. Meanwhile the concept of similar individual beings is treated just as a certain representation or reflection of universal, created by human intellect. Secondly, in solution of epistemological and logical problems of theory of universals Šmiglecki also did not escape the above-mentioned eclecticism. Explaining a relation between universals and human intellect, he presented a thomistic interpretation of such a relation based on the conception of sensible and intelligible species and division of the intellect into active and passive forms. Meanwhile, interpreting the difference between a universal and its inferiors (for example, between "animal" in "human being" and "human being" itself) this scholiast stack to a purely scotistic conception, asserting that a universal differs from its inferiors not really but formally