Concept of torture in international law

Straipsnyje nagrinėjama kankinimo samprata tarptautinėje teisėje: detalizuojami sudėtiniai kankinimo sąvokos elementai, atskleidžiamos jų turinio nustatymo problemos. Autoriai analizuoja, kas lėmė tarptautinėje teisėje vyraujančios kankinimo sąvokos, siejamos su tyčiniu specialaus subjekto veikimu ar neveikimu, kuriuo aukai sukeliamas stiprus fizinis ar psichinis skausmas ar kančia, nustatymą. Straipsnyje daromos šios pagrindinės išvados: 1.Valstybė atsako tik už specialiojo subjekto ar jo bendrininko (pagal AKKB) veikas, o pozityvi pareiga drausti ir bausti asmenis, kurie sukėlė stiprų skausmą ar kančią, numatyta visų valstybės jurisdikcijoje esančių asmenų atžvilgiu. 2. Tyčia yra būtinas nusikaltimo elementas, kai yra sprendžiamas asmens baudžiamosios atsakomybės klausimas, ir jo buvimas turi būti įrodomas. 3. Tarptautinėje bendruomenėje nėra vieningos pozicijos dėl to, ar kankinimas yra veika, kuria siekiama tik tam tikrų specifinių tikslų. 4. Ginčų nekyla, kad kankinimas turi būti suprantamas ne tik kaip veikimas, bet ir neveikimas. Toks veikimas ar neveikimas turėtų sukelti stiprų fizinį ar psichinį skausmą arba kančią, kurių stiprumas priklauso nuo kiekvienos bylos aplinkybių. Kankinimu taip pat bus laikoma veika, kuria siekiama sunaikinti auką kaip asmenybę ar susilpninti asmens fizinius bei psichinius gebėjimus, nepriklausomai nuo to, ar asmuo patyrė fizinį skausmą ar kančią, ar ne.The article aims at revealing the concept of torture in international law and establishing a clear distinction between two types of responsibility for torture: criminal responsibility of an individual and liability of a state. The analysis is based on interpretation of the provisions of international treaties (United Nations Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, European Convention of human rights, Inter-American Convention to prevent and punish torture, International Covenant on civil and political rights) submitted by institutions governing the implementation of the said documents. Besides, it takes into consideration the practice of ad hoc tribunals that invoke and interpret Article 1 of the Convention of the United Nations for the purpose of criminal responsibility of individual. Despite the clear international consensus to prohibit torture, only few attempts were made to articulate a legal definition of torture. In fact, of all the instruments that prohibit torture, only four provide any definition, and all these definitions vary. Moreover, some international documents expressly prohibit torture but do not introduce any definition. Therefore, the concept of torture is formed by means of practice of institutions supervising the implementation of the Treaties. Taking into account the development of the practice and interpretation of the definitions of torture that are found in Convention against torture and Inter-American Convention to prevent and punish torture the authors discuss whether there is an integral concept of torture in international law. The analysis brings to light the differences between the concepts of torture in different international treaties and concludes that although the definition of torture in Convention against torture is said to be representing international customary law, there is no uniform understanding of torture in international law. International criminal responsibility of individuals is by the rules of humanitarian law, which in principle applies the concept of torture, stipulated in the Convention against torture, although makes some exceptions as to the subjects of the crime. European Convention of human rights, Inter-American Convention to prevent and punish torture and International Covenant on civil and political rights deal exclusive with liability of the parties to the Conventions. The states are responsible for torture not only when severe pain or suffering is inflicted by the acts of a state official but also when the state omits to acts properly in order to prevent such consequences or investigate the crime. Moreover, in contrast to criminal responsibility of individual the intentional behaviour of a state official is presumable leaving a state concerned the right to challenge the fact. The conventions do not provide a precise list of specific purposes to qualify an act as torture differently from Convention against torture, where the list of purposes is exhaustive