Shifts of the noblemen land-ownership in the second half of the nineteenth century: sequestration and forfeiture, formation of a Russian landlord group : Kaunas and Vilnius gubernias, 1863-1873

Straipsnyje nagrinėjamas žemėvaldos veiksnio panaudojimas Rusijos imperijos politikoje vadinamajame Šiaurės vakarų krašte po 1863–1864 m. sukilimo. Žemėvaldos apribojimas buvo taikytas kaip bausmė krašto bajorams už pasipriešinimą imperijai, taip pat kaip rusų nacionalizmo strategijos instrumentas. Pirmasis bajorų žemėvaldos apribojimo etapas, kuris buvo represinis, prievartinis, truko nuo 1863 iki 1873 metų. Straipsnyje siekiama aptarti pagrindinius apribojimo instrumentus – valdų sekvestravimą, konfiskavimą, draudimus, tarp kurių išsiskiria 1865 m. gruodžio 10 d. įstatymas, rusų dvarininkų įsitvirtinimo krašte pradžią; rekonstruoti žemėvaldos apribojimų taikymo eigą ir rezultatus Vilniaus ir Kauno gubernijose.The article deals with the use of a factor of land-ownership in the policy of the Russian Empire in the so-called North Western Land. Restriction of the land-ownership was a penalty to the land noblemen for their resistance to the Empire, and an instrument of the Russian nationalistic strategy. The first phase of the land ownership limitation (1863-1873) was characterized by its repressive and forcible nature. Hence, this article aims at: discussing methods of the land-ownership limitation policy, such as: tenure sequestration, forfeiture, bans among which the law of December 10, 1863 was exceptional as the beginning of Russian landlords’ taking roots in the land; reconstructing the course as well as results of application of land-ownership restrictions in the Vilnius and Kaunas gubernias. After the uprising of 1863-1864, regulation of land property by political means did not cover economic goals. The petty, average and big noblemen landowners were the first subjects of repression in the sphere of land-ownership. Seeking to overcome the main rival in the fight for influence to the society of the land, the imperial authority declared "fight for land" (the term by D. Beauvois), in which it used political, social, national, and eventually economic methods. This fight continued up to the collapse of the Russian Empire. In the first phase of this fight for land the following strategy and direction of the imperial policy was formed: to cut powers of the local elite, to create a strong social and national/confessional balance weight able to supersede the local elite from the most relevant positions within the society. In this period, due to many reasons M. Muravyov’s vision to replace a social character and lean on local and brought Russian peasants was not implemented. That is why many hopes were set on transformation of the composition of the noblemen class, first of all, landowners. "New landlords", Russian and Orthodox, also Protestants, did not have to replace noblemen landowners "of Polish origin", but to counterbalance them. Also, autochthons of the land, such as Lutherans, Evangelical Reformers, and Moslem Tartars belonging to the noblemen class were opposed to the landlords "of Polish origin". A social model of the "new landlords" had to destroy the class structure of the noblemen landowners: only minor and major officials of various origins, newcomers to the land (noblemen, children of clergy, raznochintsy – a sort of officials of non-noble origin), merchants and citizens, matching criteria of national and political reliance, could become new landlords. Results of the first phase were multiple. Applying of property sanctions to the participants of the uprising of 1863–1864 was not aimed to drive a nail into the coffin of the noblemen class, however, sequestration and forfeiture of their estates point to the existential background of the noblemen elite. Because of compulsory sale of the sequestrated estates the patrimonies were sliding from the hands of local noblemen; a degree of these losses is uncountable. Shift of patrimonial estates to the hands of "new landlords" altered the national and social structure of the landowners group. The other thing is that formation of a group of Russian landowners (it did not bear traits of a social layer) was slow because of objective reasons, unsuccessful policy, different attitudes of local administrators towards the practical implementation of the task to extend Russian land-ownership. The limitation of noblemen land-ownership after the uprising had economic consequences as well. Economy of the sequestrated and confiscated estates, even if estates came back to their possessors in time, was damned to flounder for many years. Land turnover was limited with the help of political, economic, and social sanctions that rebounded on economy of the whole land