Add to ORKGA conventional wisdom in economics is that a model dealing frictionless markets with a large number of agents always yields a Walrasian outcome. In this paper we assess the above argument in a dynamic framework by modeling centralized auction markets, and show that in such markets the outcomes are not necessarily Walrasian; the set of stationary equilibria in our model is a continuum which includes the Walrasian equilibrium. Moreover, we also buildamodelondecentralized auction markets and obtain similar results.本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこ
In an economy with indivisible goods, a continuum of agents and quasilinear utility, we show that eq...
. The auction has been advocated as a valuable metaphor in the design of decentralized mechanisms fo...
In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of ...
A conventional wisdom in economics is that a model dealing frictionless markets with a large number ...
A model of centralized auction markets with a large number of agents is considered, where there is n...
In this paper, we present a new logic of indeterminacy of stationary monetary equilibria. We rst sho...
In an auction market where the price of each selling item is restricted to an admissible interval (p...
This paper studies the English (progressive) auction for an exchange economy with multiple objects. ...
Macroeconomic models are typically solved through the imposition of a top-down general equilibrium s...
We show that a profit maximizing monopolistic intermediary may behave approximately like a Walrasian...
A dynamic exchange economy model is presented. Similarly to the Walrasian equilibrium problem, each ...
Two broad classes of market mechanisms are compared with respect to their computational complexity. ...
[eng] We consider a discrete time, pure exchange infinite horizon economy with two or more consumers...
Dynamic auctions are trading mechanisms for discovering market-clearing prices and efficient allocat...
A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to several bidders. Each bidder demands at most one i...
In an economy with indivisible goods, a continuum of agents and quasilinear utility, we show that eq...
. The auction has been advocated as a valuable metaphor in the design of decentralized mechanisms fo...
In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of ...
A conventional wisdom in economics is that a model dealing frictionless markets with a large number ...
A model of centralized auction markets with a large number of agents is considered, where there is n...
In this paper, we present a new logic of indeterminacy of stationary monetary equilibria. We rst sho...
In an auction market where the price of each selling item is restricted to an admissible interval (p...
This paper studies the English (progressive) auction for an exchange economy with multiple objects. ...
Macroeconomic models are typically solved through the imposition of a top-down general equilibrium s...
We show that a profit maximizing monopolistic intermediary may behave approximately like a Walrasian...
A dynamic exchange economy model is presented. Similarly to the Walrasian equilibrium problem, each ...
Two broad classes of market mechanisms are compared with respect to their computational complexity. ...
[eng] We consider a discrete time, pure exchange infinite horizon economy with two or more consumers...
Dynamic auctions are trading mechanisms for discovering market-clearing prices and efficient allocat...
A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to several bidders. Each bidder demands at most one i...
In an economy with indivisible goods, a continuum of agents and quasilinear utility, we show that eq...
. The auction has been advocated as a valuable metaphor in the design of decentralized mechanisms fo...
In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of ...