Add to ORKGWe present a repeated prisoners\u27dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring, which exhibits the following paradoxical feature: the equilibrium payoff set expands and asymptotically achieves full efficiency as the public signal becomes less sensitive to the hiden actions of the players.本文フィルはリンク先を参照のこ
This dissertation studies private information in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. For this ...
I study repeated games with mediated communication and frequent actions. I derive a Folk Theorem und...
This paper studies frequent monitoring in a simple in\u85nitely repeated game with imperfect public ...
We present a repeated prisoners'dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring, which exhibits the fo...
This paper uses laboratory experiments to test the implications of the theory of repeated games on e...
We investigate two-player infinitely repeated games where the discount factor is less than but close...
In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to coordinate the...
We examine repeated prisoners\u27dilemma with imperfect private monitoring and random termination wh...
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of a mon-itoring structure on the play o...
We study the repeated two-player Prisoners' Dilemma with imperfect private monitoring and no communi...
The present paper provides a survey on the recent progress in the theory of repeated games. Many rec...
This paper experimentally examines infinitely repeated prisoners'dilemma games with imperfect privat...
We prove that there exist equilibrium payoffs arbitrarily close to the efficient payoff in the two-p...
We present a repeated prisoners ’ dilemma game with imperfect pub-lic monitoring, which exhibits the...
We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are close to repeated games with public/per...
This dissertation studies private information in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. For this ...
I study repeated games with mediated communication and frequent actions. I derive a Folk Theorem und...
This paper studies frequent monitoring in a simple in\u85nitely repeated game with imperfect public ...
We present a repeated prisoners'dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring, which exhibits the fo...
This paper uses laboratory experiments to test the implications of the theory of repeated games on e...
We investigate two-player infinitely repeated games where the discount factor is less than but close...
In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to coordinate the...
We examine repeated prisoners\u27dilemma with imperfect private monitoring and random termination wh...
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of a mon-itoring structure on the play o...
We study the repeated two-player Prisoners' Dilemma with imperfect private monitoring and no communi...
The present paper provides a survey on the recent progress in the theory of repeated games. Many rec...
This paper experimentally examines infinitely repeated prisoners'dilemma games with imperfect privat...
We prove that there exist equilibrium payoffs arbitrarily close to the efficient payoff in the two-p...
We present a repeated prisoners ’ dilemma game with imperfect pub-lic monitoring, which exhibits the...
We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are close to repeated games with public/per...
This dissertation studies private information in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. For this ...
I study repeated games with mediated communication and frequent actions. I derive a Folk Theorem und...
This paper studies frequent monitoring in a simple in\u85nitely repeated game with imperfect public ...