On the Origin of Non-valid Cognitions (tshad min gyi blo)

Non-valid cognition (apramāṇa/ tshad min gyi blo) is the opposite concept of valid cognition (pramāṇa/ tshad ma). In India, this concept did not receive great attention, although pratyakṣābhāsa, the opposite of pratyakṣa, and hetvābhāsa, the opposite of hetu, were frequently discussed by Indian scholars. This concept was, however, taken as one of the most important subjects closely related with the pramāṇa-theory by later Tibetan scholars. dGe lugs pa scholars, for example, generally divided the non-valid cognition into five as follows: (1) bcad shes, (2) yid dpyod, (3) snang la ma nges pa’i blo, (4) the tshom and (5) log shes. According to available documents, it is rNgog lo tsā ba Blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109) of gSang phu ne’u thog that propounded this set of five non-valid cognitions for the first time in the Buddhist tradition. This was widely accepted as the standard division of the non-valid cognition by Tibetan scholars of later periods except Sa skya paṇḍita and his followers of Sa skya pa. However, the matter of which non-valid cognition can be traced back to Indian original texts and which was newly created by Tibetan scholars remains unresolved. The present paper aims to shed light on the origin of these five concepts, and are drawn the following conclusions: 1. Among these five non-valid cognitions, the tshom (saṃśaya/ saṃdeha ), log shes (viparyāsajñāna/ mithyājñāna ) and bcad shes (i.e., bcad pa’i yul can, adhigataviṣaya ) can be traced back to Indian original texts. On the other hand, yid dpyod and snang la ma nges pa’i blo are not of Indian origin. According to my assumption, these two concepts were newly created by the great Tibetan logician rNgog lo tsā ba based on Dharmottara’s pramāṇa-texts, especially Pramān. aviniścayaṭīkā. 2. As for yid dpyod or its equivalent, Dharmottara regarded it as a kind of the tshom (saṃśaya/ saṃdeha ), and did not set up it as the independent concept from the tshom in his Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (cf. PVinṬ 5b3–6). Criticizing this interpretation, rNgog lo tsā ba established the concept of yid dpyod as being different from the tshom. 3. snang la ma nges pa’i blo means a cognition in which an object clearly appears (“snang la ”), but is not ascertained (“ma nges pa ”). In the epistemological system of Dharmakīrti, pratyakṣa must be snang la ma nges pa’i blo, because pratyakṣa is not regarded as an object-ascertaining cognition (cf. PVSV p. 31.21–22: na pratyakṣaṃ kasyacin niścāyakam/ tad yam api gṛhṇāti tan na niścayena/ kiṃtarhi/ tatpratibhāsena/ ). Nevertheless, rNgog lo tsā ba set up this concept as one of the non-valid cognitions. This is probably because rNgog lo tsā ba especially depends on Dharmottara’s pramāṇa-texts in which pratyaks.a is apparently described as the object-ascertaining cognition (cf. PPar II. p. 1.14f.; NBṬ p. 84.5ff.; PVinṬ * p. 15.2ff., etc.)