Experiments of Multiobject Auctions : Sequential First Price Auction, Clock Auction, and VCG Mechanism

複数種財をオークションによって売却する状況について実験をおこなった結果を，効率性，売り手収入，入札者利益などの観点から説明する．2財を2入札者によって競う取引状況を，逐次一位価格入札，時計入札，VCGメカニズムについて比較し，アンケート調査もおこなった．各入札者は，相手の金銭的利得構造を知らないことを仮定して，代替的評価と補完的評価の様々な組み合わせについて実験した．アンケートによる意識調査とは対称的に，実験においては，VCGメカニズムはおおむね好結果であるが，時計入札はExposure Problemの弊害が顕著であることを示した．This paper shows the experimental results for multi-object auctions in terms of efficiency, revenue, and bidders’ payoffs. We assume that there are two heterogeneous objects and two bidders, and that each bidder does not know the other bidder’s material payoff structure. We conducted the laboratory experiments for eight payoff structures associated with complements and substitutes. We compare three types of auction formats, i.e., sequential first price auction, clock auction, and VCG mechanism. We also research questionnaires concerning the subjects’ impressions about the performance of these formats. The experimental results imply that the VCG mechanisms generally function very well, while the performance of the clock auctions is pretty bad in some cases. These observations are in contrast with the results of the questionnaires.論文/Articl