Add to ORKGIn Tullock contests in which the common value of the prize is uncertain, information advantages are rewarded: if a player i has better information about the value than some other player j, then the payoff of i is greater or equal to the payoff of j, regardless of the information of the other players
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning...
We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal abou...
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning ...
In Tullock contests in which the common value of the prize is uncertain, information advantages are ...
We study the effect of changes of players' information on the equilibrium efforts and payoffs of Tul...
We show that in a common-value classic Tullock contests with incomplete information a player's infor...
We study how changes in the information available to the players of a sym-metric common-value Tulloc...
We show that under standard assumptions a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure st...
We study how changes in the information available to the players of a symmetric common-value Tullock...
Under standard assumptions about players’ cost functions, we show that a Tullock contest with asymme...
We show that under standard assumptions a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure str...
We study how changes in the information available to the players of a symmetric common-value Tulloc...
Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players'...
Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete infor-mation in which the playersc...
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning ...
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning...
We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal abou...
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning ...
In Tullock contests in which the common value of the prize is uncertain, information advantages are ...
We study the effect of changes of players' information on the equilibrium efforts and payoffs of Tul...
We show that in a common-value classic Tullock contests with incomplete information a player's infor...
We study how changes in the information available to the players of a sym-metric common-value Tulloc...
We show that under standard assumptions a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure st...
We study how changes in the information available to the players of a symmetric common-value Tullock...
Under standard assumptions about players’ cost functions, we show that a Tullock contest with asymme...
We show that under standard assumptions a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure str...
We study how changes in the information available to the players of a symmetric common-value Tulloc...
Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players'...
Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete infor-mation in which the playersc...
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning ...
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning...
We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal abou...
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning ...