We consider an alternative method to the classical one for the determination of Markov perfect Nash equilibria. The approach shown in the paper is based on the study of a quasi-linear system of partial differential equations instead of the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman system. The simpler structure of the former allows us to determine existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria in non-renewable resource games under some assumptions. When closed-form solutions are not available, we give a method to obtain numerical solutions.Financial support from Investigation Projects PB98-0393 of Direcci-on General de Ense˜nanza Superior e Investigaci-on Cient-XKca and VA 108/01 of Junta de Castilla y Le-on are gratefully acknowledged. The author is grateful to...
In this paper, we present a method for the characterization of Markov perfect Nash equilibria being ...
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents ...
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents ...
We consider an alternative method to the classical one for the determination of Markov perfect Nash ...
We consider an alternative method to the classical one for the determination of Markov perfect Nash ...
We consider an alternative method to the classical one for the determination of Markov perfect Nash ...
We consider an alternative method to the classical one for the determination of Markov perfect Nash ...
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents ...
In this paper, we present a method for the characterization of Markov perfect Nash equilibria being ...
In this paper, we present a method for the characterization of Markov perfect Nash equilibria being ...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comIn this paper, we present a method for ...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comIn this paper, we present a method for ...
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents ...
In this paper, we present a method for the characterization of Markov perfect Nash equilibria being ...
In this paper, we present a method for the characterization of Markov perfect Nash equilibria being ...
In this paper, we present a method for the characterization of Markov perfect Nash equilibria being ...
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents ...
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents ...
We consider an alternative method to the classical one for the determination of Markov perfect Nash ...
We consider an alternative method to the classical one for the determination of Markov perfect Nash ...
We consider an alternative method to the classical one for the determination of Markov perfect Nash ...
We consider an alternative method to the classical one for the determination of Markov perfect Nash ...
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents ...
In this paper, we present a method for the characterization of Markov perfect Nash equilibria being ...
In this paper, we present a method for the characterization of Markov perfect Nash equilibria being ...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comIn this paper, we present a method for ...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comIn this paper, we present a method for ...
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents ...
In this paper, we present a method for the characterization of Markov perfect Nash equilibria being ...
In this paper, we present a method for the characterization of Markov perfect Nash equilibria being ...
In this paper, we present a method for the characterization of Markov perfect Nash equilibria being ...
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents ...
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents ...