4 pages, 3 figures.-- PACS nrs.: 02.50.Le, 05.45.−a, 89.65.−s.Evolutionary game theory has traditionally assumed that all individuals in a population interact with each other between reproduction events. We show that eliminating this restriction by explicitly considering the time scales of interaction and selection leads to dramatic changes in the outcome of evolution. Examples include the selection of the inefficient strategy in the Harmony and Stag-Hunt games, and the disappearance of the coexistence state in the Snowdrift game. Our results hold for any population size and in more general situations with additional factors influencing fitness.Work supported by MEC (Spain) Grants No. BFM2003-0180, No. BFM2003-07749-C05-01, No. FIS2004-1001...
Every form of behavior is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through indi...
Evolutionary game theory and the adaptive dynamics approach have made invaluable contributions to un...
8 pages, 4 figures.-- ArXiv pre-print available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0512045Final publishe...
4 pages, 3 figures.-- PACS nrs.: 02.50.Le, 05.45.−a, 89.65.−s.Evolutionary game theory has tradition...
4 pages, 3 figures.-- PACS nrs.: 02.50.Le, 05.45.−a, 89.65.−s.Evolutionary game theory has tradition...
4 pages, 3 figures.-- PACS nrs.: 02.50.Le, 05.45.−a, 89.65.−s.Evolutionary game theory has tradition...
A commonly used assumption in evolutionary game theory is that natural selection acts on individuals...
A commonly used assumption in evolutionary game theory is that natural selection acts on individuals...
A commonly used assumption in evolutionary game theory is that natural selection acts on individuals...
A commonly used assumption in evolutionary game theory is that natural selection acts on individuals...
A commonly used assumption in evolutionary game theory is that natural selection acts on individuals...
A commonly used assumption in evolutionary game theory is that natural selection acts on individuals...
A commonly used assumption in evolutionary game theory is that natural selection acts on individuals...
Mathematical models with fixed parameters have a long history of use in describing the dynamics of p...
Many investigations have been carried out in order to get an idea of what the driving forces behind ...
Every form of behavior is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through indi...
Evolutionary game theory and the adaptive dynamics approach have made invaluable contributions to un...
8 pages, 4 figures.-- ArXiv pre-print available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0512045Final publishe...
4 pages, 3 figures.-- PACS nrs.: 02.50.Le, 05.45.−a, 89.65.−s.Evolutionary game theory has tradition...
4 pages, 3 figures.-- PACS nrs.: 02.50.Le, 05.45.−a, 89.65.−s.Evolutionary game theory has tradition...
4 pages, 3 figures.-- PACS nrs.: 02.50.Le, 05.45.−a, 89.65.−s.Evolutionary game theory has tradition...
A commonly used assumption in evolutionary game theory is that natural selection acts on individuals...
A commonly used assumption in evolutionary game theory is that natural selection acts on individuals...
A commonly used assumption in evolutionary game theory is that natural selection acts on individuals...
A commonly used assumption in evolutionary game theory is that natural selection acts on individuals...
A commonly used assumption in evolutionary game theory is that natural selection acts on individuals...
A commonly used assumption in evolutionary game theory is that natural selection acts on individuals...
A commonly used assumption in evolutionary game theory is that natural selection acts on individuals...
Mathematical models with fixed parameters have a long history of use in describing the dynamics of p...
Many investigations have been carried out in order to get an idea of what the driving forces behind ...
Every form of behavior is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through indi...
Evolutionary game theory and the adaptive dynamics approach have made invaluable contributions to un...
8 pages, 4 figures.-- ArXiv pre-print available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0512045Final publishe...