Add to ORKGThe paper studies two games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets. The focus is on the stability of Nash equilibrium outcomes. We provide minimal necessary and sufficient conditions guaranteeing the existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria and the stability of outcomes
International audienceAmong other solution concepts, the notion of the pure Nash equilibrium plays a...
International audienceWe extend congestion games to the setting where every resource is endowed with...
For a symmetric two-stage game, where firms first choose capacities, then compete in prices, Kreps a...
The paper studies two games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets. The focus is on th...
The paper studies two games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets. The focus is on the...
Studying the interactions between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove...
Studying the interaction between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove ...
Studying the interaction between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove ...
In this paper, we analyze capacity manipulation games in hospital-intern markets inspired by the rea...
Artículo de publicación ISI.Studying the interactions between preference and capacity manipulation ...
Studying the interaction between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove ...
Artículo de publicación ISI.Studying the interactions between preference and capacity manipulation i...
In this paper, we study many-to-one matching (hospital-intern markets) with an aftermarket. We anal...
We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We ...
This paper studies many-to-one matching markets where each student is assigned to a hospital. Each h...
International audienceAmong other solution concepts, the notion of the pure Nash equilibrium plays a...
International audienceWe extend congestion games to the setting where every resource is endowed with...
For a symmetric two-stage game, where firms first choose capacities, then compete in prices, Kreps a...
The paper studies two games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets. The focus is on th...
The paper studies two games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets. The focus is on the...
Studying the interactions between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove...
Studying the interaction between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove ...
Studying the interaction between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove ...
In this paper, we analyze capacity manipulation games in hospital-intern markets inspired by the rea...
Artículo de publicación ISI.Studying the interactions between preference and capacity manipulation ...
Studying the interaction between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove ...
Artículo de publicación ISI.Studying the interactions between preference and capacity manipulation i...
In this paper, we study many-to-one matching (hospital-intern markets) with an aftermarket. We anal...
We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We ...
This paper studies many-to-one matching markets where each student is assigned to a hospital. Each h...
International audienceAmong other solution concepts, the notion of the pure Nash equilibrium plays a...
International audienceWe extend congestion games to the setting where every resource is endowed with...
For a symmetric two-stage game, where firms first choose capacities, then compete in prices, Kreps a...