Modeling selecting and ranking alternatives characterized by multiple attributes to satisfy multiple objectives

A number of decision making problems consist in selecting and ranking alternatives (projects, candidates, policies, etc.) that are characterized by multiple attributes in order to satisfy multiple objectives. Furthermore, this process generally necessitate coping with many stakeholders opinion regarding the importance to assign to each attribute and/or each objective. Given an objective, there will be attributes that act in the sens of realization of this objective (supporting attributes), those working against the achievement of this objective (rejecting attributes) and finally some attributes may be neutral regarding the achievement of this objective. Building on such distinction of attributes, we propose in this paper an approach, based on satisficing game theory, that firstly determine satisficing alternatives, those alternatives for which the selectability measure (determined based on supporting attributes and stakeholders preferences) exeeds the rejectability mesaure (computed from rejecting attributes and stakeholders preferences) and secondly assign priorities to those satisficing alternatives so that an overall selectability exeeds an overall rejectability. An interesting thing to be noticed about this approach compared to existing ones is that it allows non homogeneity of attributes (all the alternatives do not need be characterized by the same attributes)