The problem of old evidence, first described by Glymour (1980), is still widely regarded as one of the most pressing foundational challenges to the Bayesian account of scientific reasoning. Many solutions have been proposed, but all of them have drawbacks and none of them is considered to be definitive. Here, we introduce and defend a new kind of solution, according to which hypotheses are confirmed when we become more confident that they provide the only way of accounting for the known evidence
Proponents of Bayesian confirmation theory believe that they have the solution to a significant, rec...
In a widely-cited paper, Glymour (Theory and Evidence, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press,...
I will show that, in the Problem of Old Evidence, unless a rational agent has a property I will call...
The problem of old evidence, first described by Glymour (1980), is still widely regarded as one of t...
The Problem of Old Evidence has troubled Bayesians ever since Clark Glymour first presented it in 19...
One of the most troubling and persistent challenges for Bayesian Confirmation Theory is the Problem ...
The Problem of Old Evidence is a perennial issue for Bayesian confirmation theory. Garber (1983) fam...
The Problem of Old Evidence is a perennial issue for Bayesian confirmation theory. Garber (Test Sci ...
In this paper, I consider the Problem of Old Evidence, which is meant to undermine the theory of con...
In this paper, I evaluate Hartmann & Fitelson’s solution to the Bayesian problem of old evidence by ...
We present a conservative extension of a Bayesian account of confirmation that can deal with the pro...
We present a conservative extension of a Bayesian account of confirmation that can deal with the pro...
We present a conservative extension of a Bayesian account of confirmation that can deal with the pro...
Proponents of Bayesian confirmation theory believe that they have the solution to a significant, rec...
In a widely-cited paper, Glymour (Theory and Evidence, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press,...
I will show that, in the Problem of Old Evidence, unless a rational agent has a property I will call...
The problem of old evidence, first described by Glymour (1980), is still widely regarded as one of t...
The Problem of Old Evidence has troubled Bayesians ever since Clark Glymour first presented it in 19...
One of the most troubling and persistent challenges for Bayesian Confirmation Theory is the Problem ...
The Problem of Old Evidence is a perennial issue for Bayesian confirmation theory. Garber (1983) fam...
The Problem of Old Evidence is a perennial issue for Bayesian confirmation theory. Garber (Test Sci ...
In this paper, I consider the Problem of Old Evidence, which is meant to undermine the theory of con...
In this paper, I evaluate Hartmann & Fitelson’s solution to the Bayesian problem of old evidence by ...
We present a conservative extension of a Bayesian account of confirmation that can deal with the pro...
We present a conservative extension of a Bayesian account of confirmation that can deal with the pro...
We present a conservative extension of a Bayesian account of confirmation that can deal with the pro...
Proponents of Bayesian confirmation theory believe that they have the solution to a significant, rec...
In a widely-cited paper, Glymour (Theory and Evidence, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press,...
I will show that, in the Problem of Old Evidence, unless a rational agent has a property I will call...