When we help the poor.

Only periodically since 1929 have federal policymakers considered poverty a public problem. Periods of intense legislative interest in the plight of the poor have been followed by periods of inaction, which have been followed in turn by periods of renewed interest. In this project I seek to explain why these periods of action and inaction occur at all, and why do they occur when they do. Policymakers begin paying attention to social, political, and economic conditions like poverty, I argue, when two circumstances coincide: (1) they are confronted with significant information flows attesting to the nature and extent of those conditions, primarily via the media, scholarly research, and constituent communications; and (2) legislative action on those conditions--that is, defining them as "problems" and seeking legislative solutions--serves policymakers' political and policy goals. Working from this premise, I took a variety of measures of antipoverty policy activity between 1929 and 1992--Congressional hearings, new program creation, spending for nonentitlement programs, and legislative adjustments to entitlement programs. I also took direct and indirect measures of information on poverty, and measures of the determinants of the political profitability of poverty--public opinion, partisan and ideological composition of political institutions, etc. Comparing information flows and hearings activity on poverty since 1929, I found that Congressional attention to poverty has occurred only in the wake of sudden surges in poverty-related information. Matching information surges against measures of the "political climate," I found that periods of new program creation have occurred only when substantial information flows have corresponded with political conditions rendering poverty a profitable political issue. Performing an econometric analysis of antipoverty spending over time, I found that public opinion and the partisan and ideological control of institutions have been especially strong determinants of the funding for federal programs. Finally, I found a general tendency toward legislative expansions in entitlement programs, though they sometimes have undergone restrictions to remedy cost overruns. Those expansions generally have occurred coincident with the expiration of program authority, or with a significant change in the partisan and/or ideological make-up of Congress or the presidency.PhDPolitical ScienceUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/105088/1/9635509.pdfDescription of 9635509.pdf : Restricted to UM users only