Power and decision-making in organizations.

The inquiry into the topics of power and decision making in this thesis began with a perception of two sorts of problem in the fields of organization theory and decision making: (1) Power is not treated as rigorously and extensively as it should be in organization theory, decision making, and public administration, and (2) the traditional political model of collective decision making leaves unanalyzed a large area of decision making that occurs under a non-uniform distribution of power. It is a primary purpose of this thesis to develop a decision-making model characterized by cooperative behavior in the face of differences in power. For this purpose, the thesis will (1) conceptualize power and power relations as a theoretical framework, (2) suggest a model of collective decision making in which cooperative rather than conflictual behavior is featured, and (3) report a case study of budgetary decisions to illustrate the decision-making model. In Chapters One and Two, fundamental issues pertinent to the concept of power and power relations are examined and a theoretical framework is created for the further study of the role of power in collective decision-making. Two basic questions, what is power? (the definition of power) and from what does power arise? (the bases of power), are answered in the first chapter, while theoretical findings on the dynamics of ongoing power processes are examined in the second chapter. Chapter Three considers the two central issues, power and decision making, together. In this chapter, after reviewing current perspectives on collective decision-making mechanisms and criticizing the traditional political model, a new decision-making model is suggested in which compliance serves as the decision behavior under the operation of power. In order to elaborate the new model, game theoretic analysis is used to depict various decision situations. Chapter Four presents a case study of a set of decisions in the budgetary process of the Korean government to illustrate the new model. Budgetary decision making in which power plays a significant role in obtaining compliance without resistance, in comparison with budgetary decision making that conforms to the traditional political model is investigated in this chapter.PhDPublic Policy StudiesUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/103789/1/9409729.pdfDescription of 9409729.pdf : Restricted to UM users only