Security, economy, and the end of interstate rivalry.

I investigate why interstate rivalries end, developing a rational choice model to explain why countries that have repeatedly engaged in militarized conflict sometimes settle their disagreements over important issues. I propose that continuing a rivalry involves costs that reduce leaders' ability to achieve security and domestic economic goals, and that such costs give leaders incentives to end rivalries. More specifically, I hypothesize that external security threats, a poor internal economic situation, a high military burden on the economy, and high costs expected from war will increase countries' willingness to settle their rivalries. The hypotheses are tested using statistical methods on a dataset of rivalries since 1815. The statistical tests show that of these factors, only common threats to the security of both rivals have a consistent positive impact on the end of interstate rivalries.PhDPolitical ScienceUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/103709/1/9409632.pdfDescription of 9409632.pdf : Restricted to UM users only