If entrepreneurs have private information about factors influencing the outcome of an investment, individual lending is inefficient. The literature emphasizes improvements through non-market organizations that harness local information through peer monitoring. I investigate the complementary question of designing a credit mechanism when local information is limited, disabling peer monitoring. I show that a pooling mechanism that does not rely on peer monitoring can implement a market for rights-to-borrow, restoring efficiency. The mechanism achieves a strict Pareto improvement - providing incentive for each type of agent to join. Further, even though the mechanism involves pooling - and consequent implicit transfers from better types to wor...
This paper characterizes an optimal group loan contract with costly peer monitoring. Using a fairly ...
In recent years group lending has become an increasingly utilized tool for providing credit access t...
The paper attempts to find the socially best loan contract by comparing exante welfare, interest and...
If entrepreneurs have private information about factors influencing the outcome of an investment, in...
If entrepreneurs have private information about factors influencing the outcome of an investment, in...
A major problem for institutional lenders is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of...
This paper analyzes the conditions under which joint liability loans to encourage peer-monitoring wo...
Peer-group mechanisms have been widely used by micro-credit institutions to minimize default risk. H...
ABSTRACT. We study the problem of loan enforcement in an informal credit market with limited informa...
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2017.Cataloged from ...
We study alternative mechanisms facing adverse selection and moral hazard, as well as the problems o...
We present a model of the credit market under imperfect information, with a lender and many would-be...
While group lending has attracted a lot of attention, the impact of collusion on the performance of ...
We develop a simple model of group-lendingbased on peer monitoring and moral hazard. We find that, i...
In this paper, micro-finance programme through joint liability credit contract is explained with the...
This paper characterizes an optimal group loan contract with costly peer monitoring. Using a fairly ...
In recent years group lending has become an increasingly utilized tool for providing credit access t...
The paper attempts to find the socially best loan contract by comparing exante welfare, interest and...
If entrepreneurs have private information about factors influencing the outcome of an investment, in...
If entrepreneurs have private information about factors influencing the outcome of an investment, in...
A major problem for institutional lenders is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of...
This paper analyzes the conditions under which joint liability loans to encourage peer-monitoring wo...
Peer-group mechanisms have been widely used by micro-credit institutions to minimize default risk. H...
ABSTRACT. We study the problem of loan enforcement in an informal credit market with limited informa...
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2017.Cataloged from ...
We study alternative mechanisms facing adverse selection and moral hazard, as well as the problems o...
We present a model of the credit market under imperfect information, with a lender and many would-be...
While group lending has attracted a lot of attention, the impact of collusion on the performance of ...
We develop a simple model of group-lendingbased on peer monitoring and moral hazard. We find that, i...
In this paper, micro-finance programme through joint liability credit contract is explained with the...
This paper characterizes an optimal group loan contract with costly peer monitoring. Using a fairly ...
In recent years group lending has become an increasingly utilized tool for providing credit access t...
The paper attempts to find the socially best loan contract by comparing exante welfare, interest and...