Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number of bidders and the winner’s curse in terms of its frequency of occurrence and its expected harm. From a design perspective, we find that both the number of bidders and the level of affiliation are instrumental when choosing an auction format and whether to encourage or discourage bidder participation
This paper analyzes how listing price and bidding strategies impact sales prices in non-distressed r...
We empirically assess the winner’s curse effect in auctions for toll road concessions. First, we inv...
We empirically assess the effect of the winner's curse in auctions for toll road concessions, taking...
Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number of bidders ...
Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number of bidders...
The second-price sealed-bid common-value auction exhibits lower winner's curse probability compared ...
File URL: http://www.cni.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/documents/RePEc/cni/working_paper/athias_nunez_2006_...
Auctions of government securities typically permit bidders to enter multiple price-quantity bids. De...
In this paper, we empirically assess the effects of the winner’s curse in auctions for road concessi...
Abstract: In common value auctions the winning bid often exceeds the value of the good purchased. T...
Auction theory predictions are used to test if winning bidders overpay (the "winner's curse") in FDI...
We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of th...
We study the monotonicity of the equilibrium bid with respect to the number of bidders n in affiliat...
This paper challenges the view that winner's curse phenomena should be at-tributed to the exist...
We report the results of a series of second-price auction experiments where each bidder's signal is ...
This paper analyzes how listing price and bidding strategies impact sales prices in non-distressed r...
We empirically assess the winner’s curse effect in auctions for toll road concessions. First, we inv...
We empirically assess the effect of the winner's curse in auctions for toll road concessions, taking...
Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number of bidders ...
Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number of bidders...
The second-price sealed-bid common-value auction exhibits lower winner's curse probability compared ...
File URL: http://www.cni.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/documents/RePEc/cni/working_paper/athias_nunez_2006_...
Auctions of government securities typically permit bidders to enter multiple price-quantity bids. De...
In this paper, we empirically assess the effects of the winner’s curse in auctions for road concessi...
Abstract: In common value auctions the winning bid often exceeds the value of the good purchased. T...
Auction theory predictions are used to test if winning bidders overpay (the "winner's curse") in FDI...
We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of th...
We study the monotonicity of the equilibrium bid with respect to the number of bidders n in affiliat...
This paper challenges the view that winner's curse phenomena should be at-tributed to the exist...
We report the results of a series of second-price auction experiments where each bidder's signal is ...
This paper analyzes how listing price and bidding strategies impact sales prices in non-distressed r...
We empirically assess the winner’s curse effect in auctions for toll road concessions. First, we inv...
We empirically assess the effect of the winner's curse in auctions for toll road concessions, taking...
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